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FROZEN CHARTERS
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This Article provides the first empirical and policy analysis of the broker voting change
and its significant unintended consequences. I provide empirical evidence that the broker
voting change has resulted in the failure of more than fifty charter amendments at U.S.
public companies, despite board approval and overwhelming shareholder support, and that
hundreds more companies have frozen charters as a result of the change. The rule change
has also made it more difficult to amend corporate bylaws and given some insiders a defacto veto in proxy voting contests. These costs substantially outweigh the negligible benefits
of the broker voting change. I compare a number of solutions to address these problems and
identify several that would be preferable to the current approach.
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and its significant unintended consequences. I provide empirical evidence that the broker
voting change has resulted in the failure of more than fifty charter amendments at U.S.
public companies, despite board approval and overwhelming shareholder support, and that
hundreds more companies have frozen charters as a result of the change. The rule change
has also made it more difficult to amend corporate bylaws and given some insiders a defacto veto in proxy voting contests. These costs substantially outweigh the negligible benefits
of the broker voting change. I compare a number of solutions to address these problems and
identify several that would be preferable to the current approach.
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Frozen Charters

Introduction
In 2011, a large U.S. public corporation put forward an amendment to
its charter, the central document establishing the internal rules of the
corporation.1 The board of directors and management supported and
recommended the change. At the required shareholder vote on the
amendment, more than 99% of the votes cast were in favor of the
amendment. But the amendment failed. Directors, managers, and
shareholders supported a change in the company’s charter, yet were unable
to change it. The company’s charter is frozen. This result is the
consequence of a 2012 change in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
policies relating to broker voting rules,2 Information Memorandum 12-4
(hereinafter the broker voting change). Although the broker voting change
was intended to protect investors and improve corporate governance and
accountability, it has had the opposite effect. This is the first article to
analyze the significant unintended consequences of the broker voting
change, and to identify the problem of frozen charters.
Approximately 85% of investors hold shares through brokers, and many
of those investors do not instruct brokers how to vote their shares at annual
meetings. Uninstructed broker votes therefore represent a substantial
proportion of the outstanding shares of many corporations (an average of
10% in my sample). In order to protect shareholders from the potentially
distortive effects of voting by brokers (who do not have an economic interest
in the corporation), the NYSE, whose rules effectively govern broker

1

2

The amendment took place pursuant to a 2011 agreement with a client of the
Shareholder Rights Project, at which time I served as Associate Director of the
Project. For further information on the work of the Shareholder Rights Project
during the years 2011-2014, see Shareholder Rights Project, Harv. L. Sch.
Program on Institutional Inv., http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/
index.shtml [http://perma.cc/8G6R-K2SL].
Although the change related to NYSE Rule 452, see infra note 3, it was
technically a change of interpretation of the rule, rather than a rule change itself,
as is discussed further in Section I.B.3.
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voting,3 has progressively limited the instances in which brokers may vote
shares. Based on this concern, in 2012, the NYSE restricted brokers from
voting uninstructed shares on charter and bylaw amendments.
Although the intention of the broker voting change was to protect
investors and enfranchise shareholders, it has done neither. By preventing
uninstructed broker voting, the rule change was intended to prevent voting
distortions. However, the rule change has instead created a different kind of
distortion.4 Preventing brokers from voting uninstructed shares means that
none of those shares will be voted in favor of the proposal, even though some
of the shares have beneficial owners that are in favor of the proposal. Where
the proposal failed, but would have passed had the uninstructed shares that
supported the proposal voted, the outcome is what I term a “distorted fail.”
The main type of distorted fail results from the broker voting change is
frozen charters. Despite strong support from shareholders and directors,
there are a number of corporations that, because of high supermajority
requirements for amending parts of their charters, are unable to reach these
thresholds without uninstructed broker votes. Empirical data on the number
of failed charter amendments since the broker voting change was
implemented reveals the impact of the rule change. In the three years after
the broker voting change took effect, in 54 of the 63 companies where
charter amendments failed despite receiving overwhelming shareholder
support,5 the company would have had their amendments pass had the

3

4
5

Broker voting is generally governed by NYSE Rule 452. See N.Y. Stock
Exch. Inc., The Official Constitution and Rules of the
New York Stock Exchange R.452 (2016) [hereinafter Rule 452],
http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=c
hp_1_5_12_3&manual=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F
[http://perma.cc/MF9M-DBY8]; see also id. at R.452.10 (listing “when
member organization may vote without customer instructions” and
substantially restating the provisions of Rule 452). See Section I.C below for
further details and discussion.
I develop a theory that explains these different kinds of distortions in Part II.
I arbitrarily define “overwhelming shareholder support” as support from
shareholders representing 90% of votes cast. The 90% threshold has valence as
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broker voting change not been implemented.6 Overall, the broker voting
change has significantly increased the proportion of charter amendments
that fail despite receiving overwhelming shareholder support and has
increased the likelihood of failure for charter amendments in a statistically
and economically significant manner.
There are two other related kinds of distorted fail results from the broker
voting change. Similar to frozen charters, the elimination of discretionary
broker voting has prevented shareholders of a number of corporations from
amending the bylaws of those corporations. And in a number of other
companies, the prohibition on broker voting has left insiders with a de facto
veto right over certain charter amendments.
The unintended, shareholder-harming distorted fail results from the
broker voting change should be weighed against its intended consequence,
of preventing what I term “distorted passes” from uninstructed broker
voting. Uninstructed broker votes will result in a distorted pass when a
majority of the shareholders of the corporation prefer that a proposal fail,
but uninstructed broker votes in favor of the proposal cause it to pass.
However, most charter amendments are strongly supported by
shareholders, and brokers generally follow management recommendations
by supporting these charter amendments. Thus, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, there would be no distortive effects of broker voting on

6

a measure of overwhelming support within corporate law—for instance, as the
ownership threshold (albeit of shares outstanding) above which a short-form
merger procedure is permitted in Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253.
See the analysis and assumptions discussed in Section I.B, infra. In particular,
this assumes that shareholders would have voted or not voted in the same
proportions had the broker voting change not been implemented. While it is
impossible to tell whether this is the case, there are significant reasons to
suggest that this is the case. In particular, very little information was released
around the time of the broker voting change about its effect on corporate
governance proposals, and there has been almost no discussion since that time.
Given that most shareholders were likely unaware of the effects of the change,
there would have been no basis for them to change their voting behavior.
Anecdotal evidence from discussions with corporate governance
representatives of institutional investors suggests that the broker voting change
had no effect on their voting behavior.

3
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charter amendments. The number of cases where there may be distorted
pass outcomes is very small: there have been no charter amendments since
the broker voting change came into effect that would have had distorted pass
outcomes had broker votes been permitted, and only one other management
proposal (0.12% of all management proposals during that period).
In fact, the foregoing analysis significantly underestimates the true
effect of the broker voting change, because only a small number of charter
amendments go to a vote each year. I use a novel method to estimate the
number of companies that are affected by the consequences of the broker
voting change, using corporations’ voting requirements and turnout in
director elections. I estimate that between 13% and 15% of U.S. corporations
have been rendered unable to amend part of their charters as a result of the
broker voting change. In addition, between 7% and 8% of corporations
effectively have an insider veto as a result of the broker voting change, and
between 8% and 9.5% of corporations now have board-only bylaw
amendments as a result of the broker voting change. I also estimate the
number of companies where eliminating broker voting has prevented
distorted pass results, and find that, based on current patterns of support for
corporate governance proposals, the broker voting change would prevent
distorted pass results at only 0.1% of companies. In short, the broker voting
change was implemented to solve a problem that—if it existed at all—had
negligible effects.
These empirical results allow for an evaluation of the broker voting
change against its own implicit policy goals of protecting investors,
enfranchising shareholders, and improving corporate governance and
accountability. The substantial negative effects of the broker voting change
in creating distorted fail results—preventing charter and bylaw
amendments desired by shareholders and giving insiders a veto over charter
amendments—significantly outweigh its very limited benefits in preventing
distorted pass results.
The broker voting change failed so clearly against the policy goals it
references because charter amendment votes differ in two important
respects from director elections and executive compensation vote, which
the broker voting change did not reflect. First, as opposed to director

4
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election and executive compensation votes, where shareholders may choose
to express their dissatisfaction with director or management compensation,
shareholders generally support charter amendments. This is due to the fact
that directors generally do not put forward charter amendments that are
unlikely to garner such support. Second, the manner in which proxy votes
are tallied differs markedly between the different types of proposals.
Whether directors are elected and executive compensation proposals pass
depends on their level of support as a proportion of the votes cast at the
meeting. However, charter amendments require a proportion of shares
outstanding in order to pass, and often a supermajority of shares
outstanding. As a result, excluding uninstructed broker votes has a much
more significant effect in a charter amendment proposal.
Given these differences, it was inapposite to apply reasoning from
recent changes to Rule 452 to uninstructed broker voting on corporate
governance proposals. Such unintended results could have been prevented
had the broker voting change been implemented in a different manner.
Whereas other changes to broker voting rules in the past have involved
lengthy processes including public disclosure and comment, the broker
voting change involved neither. Had public comment been permitted,
corporations, investors, or their representatives may have pointed out the
potential negative consequences of the broker voting change.
After offering an empirical analysis of the broker voting change, I
consider the implications of the rule from a number of perspectives. From a
firm value perspective, the broker voting change prevents value-enhancing
changes to the corporation. From the contractarian framework of corporate
law scholarship, the broker voting change is problematic in that it changes
an implicit term on which the amendment provisions contained in corporate
charters rely, thereby changing the terms of the corporate contract from
those which the parties intended. Additionally, examining the broker voting
change from the perspective of directors and managers suggests that certain
directors and managers may actually prefer that particular charter

5
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amendments be stymied by the broker voting change.7 Therefore, instead of
empowering shareholders, the rule change may disempower shareholders of
some corporations to the benefit of their managers.
There are a number of possible alternatives to address the distorted fail
results created by the broker voting change. Although the current pattern of
support for charter amendments and other corporate governance proposals
means there are very few potential distorted pass results, it is possible to
imagine alternative scenarios in which this is not the case. Any analysis
should therefore consider the likely effects of such solutions in both
reducing distorted fail results and avoiding distorted pass results.
The simplest solution, reversing the broker voting change, would
eliminate the distorted fail results of frozen charters, failed bylaw votes, and
insider vetoes created by the broker voting change. However, it would
reinstate the possibility of distorted pass results, albeit in what are likely to
be very limited numbers. Another possibility would be to implement
strategies to reduce the number of undirected broker votes, which would
reduce both distorted pass and distorted fail results. However, such efforts
may be costly, and are unlikely to provide a complete solution to the
problem. A more promising alternative, proportional voting, whereby
brokers vote uninstructed shares in the same proportion as other
shareholders at the meeting or other shareholder clients of the broker, has
the possibility of eliminating both kinds of distortion.
Finally, broker voting rules could be amended to allow broker voting on
certain types of corporate governance proposals where distorted fail
outcomes would otherwise be likely, but where distorted pass outcomes
would not, such as amendments to remove supermajority provisions,
amendments that shareholders generally support, or amendments for which
a supermajority is required.

7

As I explain further in Section I.C, I do not suggest that the broker voting change
was implemented as a result of pressure from such issuers or their advisors on
the NYSE to implement the rule, as the interviews I conducted with NYSE and
SEC officials suggest that this was not the case. See notes of interviews
conducted with senior NYSE and SEC officials, on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation.
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These solutions offer the possibility of reducing the likelihood of
distorted fail results, while also minimizing the possibility of distorted pass
results. In order to avoid the procedural shortcomings involved in
implementing the broker voting change, any reform should take place
through the NYSE rulemaking process, with notice and public comment,
and an SEC determination that the new rule has the effect of protecting
investors. In the interim, the NYSE should reverse the broker voting change
to prevent the harm it is currently causing to investors.
The existing literature regarding charter amendments, broker voting,
and the effect of the broker voting change in particular on charter
amendments, remains extremely limited. Financial economists have tried to
quantify the extent of broker voting and its effects. Before the disclosure of
broker non-votes made such questions obsolete, two articles compared
voting results for routine and non-routine issues to estimate the extent of
broker voting, and its direction.8 In explaining why “management always
wins the close ones,” Yair Listokin considered in passing the possible
effects of distortions by broker voting, and presented evidence about the
effects of the 2003 limitation on broker voting on executive compensation
plans.9 A recent working paper also considered the effects of the 2009
prohibition of uninstructed broker voting on director elections.10 Following
the release of Information Memorandum 12-4, a number of lawyers and

8

9

10

Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 Fin. Mgmt. 29 (2002);
James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Voting: Evidence from Charter Amendment
Proposals, 1 J. Corp. Fin. 5 (1994).
Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 Am. L. & Econ.
Rev. 159, 179 (2008).
Ali C. Akyol et al., The Elimination of Broker Voting in Director Elections, (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973558 [http://perma.cc/U8J4-FVFU].
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other practitioners noted the change,11 and several commentators
speculated about its potential effects on charter amendments.12

11

12

See, e.g., NYSE Restricts Broker Discretionary Voting for Certain Corporate
Governance Matters, Cleary M&A & Corp. Governance Watch (Jan.
26, 2012), http://www.clearymawatch.com/2012/01/nyse-restricts-brokerdiscretionary-voting-for-certain-corporate-governance-matters/
[http://perma.cc/93VV-H3VU]; Carol McGee, Broadening the Range of ‘Broker
May Not Vote’ Matters, Law360 (Feb. 10, 2012, 3:05 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/307016/broadening-the-range-of-brokermay-not-vote-matters [http://perma.cc/SQM7-FG97]; NYSE Further Restricts
Broker Discretionary Voting, Ctr. for Study of Fin. Mkt. Evolution
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://csfme.org/Outreach/Lender-Directed-Voting/nysefurther-restricts-broker-discretionary-voting
[http://perma.cc/W3XEBTTF].
See, e.g., NYSE Further Restricts Broker-Discretionary Voting Under Rule 452,
Shearman
&
Sterling
LLP
1
(Jan.
31,
2012),
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2012
/01/NYSE-Further-Restricts-BrokerDiscretionary-Votin__/Files/View-fullmemo-NYSE-Further-Restricts-BrokerDisc__/FileAttachment/
NYSEFurtherRestrictsBrokerDiscretionaryVotingund__.pdf [http://perma.
cc/HX52-DWWW] (“[C]ompanies may find it more difficult to pass corporate
governance proposals (or defeat similar shareholder proposals) in the future.
Proposals that require a majority of the outstanding shares for approval will be
particularly challenging . . . .”); NYSE Further Limits Broker Discretionary
Voting on Corporate Governance Proposals for the 2012 Proxy Season, Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1 (Feb. 26, 2012),
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/Final%20-%202-26-12%20%20NYSE%20Further%20Limits%20Broker%20Discretionary%20Voting1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2N4F-ELAG] (“[C]ompanies will likely find it more difficult
to pass all types of proposals related to corporate governance, especially where
a majority of the outstanding shares is required for approval.”); NYSE Tightens
the Loop on Broker Discretionary Voting; What’s the Impact on Proxy Solicitations?,
Georgeson (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.georgeson.com/us/resource/
Documents/GeorgesonReport_012612.pdf [http://perma.cc/5X3E-RWB4]
(“[T]he change could have a considerable impact on companies seeking certain
governance-related changes.”); Matt Orsagh, New York Stock Exchange Quietly
Concedes More Power to Investors, CFA Inst. Mkt. Integrity Insights
(Feb. 15, 2012), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2012/02/15/
new-york-stock-exchange-quietly-concedes-more-power-to-investors/
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However, the change went almost unremarked upon by academic
researchers,13 and the limited practitioner attention soon abated. This
Article represents the first economic and empirical analysis of the broker
voting change.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I explains the charter
amendment process, broker voting, and the broker voting rules, including

13

[http://perma.cc/JLW3-L6DX] (“Investors should be aware of unintended
consequences. The new rule will make it more difficult for companies with
supermajority requirements (such as 75% or 80% of shares outstanding) to obtain
enough votes to pass shareholder-friendly management resolutions.”); NYSE
Limits Broker Voting on Corporate Governance Proposals, O’Melveny &
Myers LLP (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-andpublications/publications/nyse-revises-broker-voting-on-corporategovernance-proposals/ [http://perma.cc/W3W2-HDNH] (“One practical
implication of the NYSE’s new position is that companies may face increased
difficulty in obtaining the necessary support for these governance proposals.
This could especially impact companies seeking support for proposals requiring
approval of a majority (or greater) of the shares outstanding . . . .”); Louis Lehot
et al., Public Company Control Alert: NYSE Acts To Further Limit Broker Votes on
Specified Corporate Governance Proposals, Corp. & Sec. L. Blog (Jan. 30,
2012),
http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.
com/2012/01/publiccompany-control-alert-nyse-acts-to-further-limit-broker-votes-on-specifiedcorporate-governance-proposals/ [http://perma.cc/4W2A-RMAF] (“[T]he
loss of broker discretionary votes may have a material effect on the ability of a
company to obtain shareholder approval for a company-supported governance
proposal.”); Emily Chasan, NYSE Broker Voting Restriction Could Complicate
Proxies,
Wall
St.
J.
(Jan.
31,
2012,
2:39
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/01/31/nyse-broker-voting-restriction-couldcomplicate-proxies/ [http://perma.cc/2PVV-X4Y2] (“The new rule makes it
. . . harder for management to get a supermajority vote when trying to enact
more significant governance changes, such as altering anti-takeover provisions
or destaggering board of director appointments.”).
One exception is the consideration given to the broker voting change by
Professor J. Robert Brown Jr., who speculated about its potential effects on the
ability of corporations to achieve quorum requirements. J. Robert Brown Jr.,
NYSE Rule 452 and Voting Uninstructed Shares (Part 3),
TheRacetotheBottom.org
(Feb.
1,
2012,
6:00
AM),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/2012/2/1/nyse-rule-452-andvoting-uninstructed-shares-part-3.html [http://perma.cc/HEW6-XQR7].
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the recent changes that established the policy on which the broker voting
change was based, and the broker voting change itself. Part II examines the
kinds of distortion created by broker voting—distorted pass outcomes and
distorted fail outcomes—and uses these to demonstrate the consequences
of the broker voting change on charter and bylaw amendments in the period
since it was implemented. Part III expands this analysis by considering those
companies that have been unwittingly affected by the broker voting change,
but may not yet have brought charter or bylaw amendments. Part IV
evaluates the broker voting change from its own perspective of investor
protection, as well as several other perspectives, and Part V considers
potential solutions for addressing the negative consequences of frozen
charters.

I. Charter Amendments and Broker Voting
This Article examines the phenomenon of frozen charters, and links it
to the effect of recent broker voting changes. In this Part I, I first set out the
background of shareholder voting to approve charter amendments. I then
focus on part of the shareholder vote—voting of uninstructed shares by
brokers. I examine the rules that govern broker voting, most notably NYSE
Rule 452, and then move to consider recent changes to the broker voting
rules, including the broker voting change contained in Information
Memorandum 12-4.
A. Amending Corporate Charters
The general procedure for amending the charter of a corporation is for
the board of directors of the corporation to approve an amendment to the
charter, and for directors to put forward a proposal that the amendment be
approved by a vote of shareholders.14 The proposal is then voted on at a

14

See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1).
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meeting of shareholders.15 If the amendment is approved, it is formalized by
a filing with the secretary of state of the corporation’s state of incorporation.
The vote threshold required to approve an amendment varies from state
to state, and from company to company. Default rules vary between
requiring a majority of outstanding shares,16 two-third of outstanding
shares,17 and a majority of the votes cast at a meeting at which a quorum of
the majority of the outstanding shares are present.18 Each state permits a

15

16

17

18

Generally, the meeting at which this occurs is the annual shareholders meeting,
though it can also be voted on at a special meeting of shareholders. Some states
may allow shareholder approval by written consent in lieu of a meeting. See, e.g.,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 228.
Sixteen states, including Delaware, California, and New York, require approval
by a majority of outstanding shares as a default rule. See, e.g., Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1). The other states in this group are Alaska, Hawaii,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington. See Alaska Stat.
§ 10.06.504(a) (Ak.); Cal. Corp. Code § 902 (Cal.); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 414-283 (Haw.); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-6602 (Kan.); 13-C Me. Rev.
Stat. § 1003 (Me.); Mich. Corp. L. Stat. § 450.1611 (Mich.); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 351.090 (Mo.); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.390 (Nev.);
N.J. Stat. § 14A:9-2 (N.J.); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-13-2 (N.M.); N.Y.
Bus. Corp. § 803 (N.Y.); Okla. Stat. tit. 18 § 1077 (Okla.); 15 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 1914 (Pa.); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.2-903 (R.I.); Wash.
Rev. Code § 23B.10.030.
Eight states require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares
as a default rule. The states in this group are Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. See 805 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/10.20 (Ill.); La. Stat. Ann. 12:31 (La.); Md. Code
Ann. Corps. & Ass’ns. § 2-604 (Md.); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, §
10.03 (Mass.); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1701.71 (Ohio); S.C. Code Ann. §
33-10-103 (S.C.); Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.364 (Tex.); Va.
Code Ann. § 13.1-707 (Va.).
Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia follow the provisions of the
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), which requires a majority of the
votes cast at a meeting at which a quorum of the outstanding shares is present.
See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.25(c). The states in this group are
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi,
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corporation to require a greater vote requirement,19 and a significant
number of corporations take advantage of this provision with charter
provisions requiring votes of, for example, 66%, 75%, or 80% of outstanding
shares in order to approve an amendment to important parts of the charter.20
Although a supermajority provision could require supermajority approval
for amending any part of the charter, they most frequently apply to antitakeover provisions. Table 1 below sets out the distribution of voting
requirements for the sample of companies I use in Part III.21

Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See Ala. Code § 10A-2-10.03 (Ala.); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 10-1003 (Ariz.); Ark. Code Ann. § 4-27-1003 (Ark.); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 7-110-103 (Colo.); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-797 (Conn.); D.C.
Code § 29-308.03 (D.C.); Fla. Stat. § 607.1003 (Fla.); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 14-2-1003 (Ga.); Idaho Code § 30-1-1003 (Idaho.); Ind. Code § 23-138-3 (Ind.); Iowa Code § 490.1003 (Iowa); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
271B.10-030 (Ky.); Minn. Stat. § 302A.135 (Minn.); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 79-4-10.03 (Miss.); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-227 (Mont.); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 21-20,118 (Neb.); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:10.03 (N.H.);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-10-03 (N.C.); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-19 (N.D.);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.437 (Or.); S.D. Codified Laws § 47-1A-1003
(S.D.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-20-103 (Tenn.); Utah Code Ann. § 1610a-1003 (Utah); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 10.03 (Vt.); W. Va. Code §
31D-10-1003 (W. Va.); Wis. Stat. § 180.1003 (Wis.); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 17-16-1003 (Wyo.).
19

20

21

See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4).

See, e.g., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of
Chesapeake
Energy
Corporation
(Aug.
10,
2001)
(“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Certificate of Incorporation to
the contrary, the affirmative vote of the holders of at least sixty-six and twothirds percent (66 2/3%) of the issued and outstanding stock having voting
power, voting together as a single class, shall be required to amend, repeal or
adopt any provision inconsistent with Articles V, VI, VII, VIII and this Article
IX of this Certificate of Incorporation.”).
As explained in Part III, these are companies incorporated in the United States
that are part of the Russell 3000 index, which contains the largest 3,000
corporations listed on exchanges in the United States. For a discussion of the
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Table 1: Voting Requirements for Charter Amendments at
U.S.-incorporated Russell 3000 Corporations
Vote Standard
Votes Cast

Shares Outstanding

Percentage

Companies

%

50%

150

5.8%

50%

917

35.3%

50% - 59%

1

0.0%

60% - 69%

874

33.7%

70% - 79%

245

9.4%

80% - 89%

392

15.1%

90% - 100%

17

0.7%

2,596

100.0%

Total

As Table 1 shows, 25.2% of the companies in my sample require approval
of 70% or more of the outstanding shares of the corporation to amend part
of their charters. Most supermajority requirements are a percentage of
shares outstanding, rather of the votes cast on the proposal. If all outstanding
shares were voted, these proportions would be the same. In reality, a
substantial percentage of shareholders do not vote, significantly reducing
the proportion of outstanding shares that are actually voted, which I refer to
as “shareholder turnout.”22
The level of shareholder turnout in corporations varies with the level of
institutional ownership of the corporation.23 Of shares held by institutions,

composition of the Russell 3000 and an explanation of why I use it, see infra
note 75.
22
. I exclude uninstructed broker votes from “shareholder turnout,” so
shareholder turnout is the number of shares that are voted for, against, or
abstain on a proposal (but not uninstructed broker shares), divided by the
number of outstanding shares of the corporation.
23
Many institutional investors, including investment advisers and pension funds
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
have a fiduciary duty to vote their shares. See, e.g., Letter from Alan D.
Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dept. of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl,
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an average of 90% were voted at annual meetings in 2013, whereas only 30%
of shares owned by individual or retail investors were voted.24 The
distribution of shareholder turnout (excluding uninstructed broker votes)
for director elections from 2012 to 2014 for my sample is set out in Figure 1
below.25

24

25

Chairman Ret. Board, Avon Products Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988) (reprinted at 15
Pens. Reptr. (BNA) 391); Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant
Sec’y, Dept. of Labor, to Robert Monks, Pres., Institutional S’holders Servs.,
Inc. 3 (Jan. 23, 1990) (reprinted at 17 Pens. Reptr. (BNA) 244); Interpretive
Bulletin Relating to Written Statements of Investment Policy, including Proxy
Voting Policy or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (July 29, 1994); Interpretive
Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements
of Investment Policy Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2509.08-2 (October 17, 2008).
See 2013 Proxy Season Recap, Third Edition, ProxyPulse (2013),
http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-PwC-ProxyPulseThird-Edition.pdf [http://perma.cc/7MSY-2WQ5]. Note that the data
published by Broadridge is based on shares held in street name.
Figure 1 and similar figures showing distributions throughout this Article are
density histograms with bin width of 1%, rendered as line charts.
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Figure 1: Shareholder Turnout in Director Elections for Russell 3000
Companies, 2012-14
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As Figure 1 makes clear, turnout is generally high—the median turnout
is 81.0%. However, there are a substantial number of corporations that have
turnout below some of the significant supermajority thresholds mentioned
in Table 1—almost 50% of meetings had turnout below 80% of shares
outstanding. As a result, the treatment of uninstructed broker votes can be
central to whether or not charter amendments pass.
B. Broker Voting
Under state law, the right to vote shares of the corporation belongs to
the registered owner (or record holder) of the shares.26 While it is possible
for an investor to be directly registered as the owner of shares, most

26

This is the person or entity that is listed in the share register of the corporation.
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 219 (describing the list of stockholders
entitled to vote at the meeting of stockholders, including the number of shares
registered in the name of the stockholder).
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investors hold shares through securities intermediaries,27 such as a broker,
bank, or custodian. In these cases, the intermediary is the registered owner
of the shares, and the investor owns in “street name”—their interest as the
beneficial owner is recorded in the books of the intermediary.28 Investors
generally buy shares through brokers who place orders on their behalf
through stock exchanges that manage the transfer of the shares from the
seller’s broker.29 Although an investor can request that their broker transfer
the registration to the investor, such requests are rare.30 As a result, brokers
and other intermediaries are the registered owners of approximately 85% of
public company shares.31
Shareholder voting takes place by proxy. The corporation distributes a
form of proxy and an accompanying proxy statement to shareholders.32

27

28

29

30

31

32

“Securities intermediary” is defined in Act Rule 17Ad-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240 of
the General Rules and Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) to include a clearing agency
registered under Section 17A of the Exchange Act or a person, including a bank,
broker, or dealer, that maintains securities accounts for others.
For simplicity, I will generally refer to intermediaries as “brokers,” though in
actual fact particular investors may have intermediaries that are brokers, banks,
or custodians, or some combination thereof. The Exchange Act and NYSE
Rules use the term “broker-dealer.” A “broker” is defined as a person who
undertakes transactions in securities for the account of others, see 15 U.S.C. §
3(a)(4), whereas a “dealer” is one who buys and sells securities for their own account,
see id. § 3(a)(5).
The shares are often held by another intermediary called a “custodian.” In the
case of large retail brokers, custodian entities are often under common
ownership with the broker entity.
Investors and brokers disfavor this approach, as it increases the difficulty, cost,
and time required to transfer the shares, and brokers may charge the investor
an additional fee to transfer the registration.
See, e.g., Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics: Topic One: Share Ownership and
Voting, Sec. & Exchange Commission (May 23, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm
[http://perma.cc/Q7X4-XPAN] (“Approximately 85% of exchange-traded
securities are held by securities intermediaries.”).
It is also possible that the corporation may give notice of where to access proxy
materials online, in lieu of sending the materials themselves.
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Shareholders complete the form of proxy, authorizing certain proxy holders
(usually the directors of the corporation) to vote on their behalf, in favor or
against each proposal on the proxy form as the shareholder specifies.33 If the
shareholder is the record owner, they complete their own proxy form.
However, where the shareholder holds shares in street name, the broker is
the registered owner of the shares, and rules applicable to the broker govern
the voting of the shares.
Broker voting is governed by the exchanges of which the broker is a
member, including with respect to the voting of shares that are listed on
other exchanges.34 Because almost all brokers are members of the NYSE,
the NYSE Rules govern essentially all broker voting in companies listed on
U.S. exchanges. Where a shareholder holds shares in street name, the
broker is the registered owner and receives the corporation’s proxy
materials.35 The broker sends these proxy materials to the beneficial owner
or their investment adviser, either with a blank, signed proxy form, or a
request that the beneficial owner provide the broker with voting

33

34

35

For many corporations, shareholders may give their proxy electronically or
telephonically as well as in physical form.
See Rule 452, supra note 3; see also N.Y. Stock. Exch. Inc. Mkt. LLC.
Comp. Guide § 723 (relating to members of NYSE MKT exchange
(formerly, the American Stock Exchange), which is substantively identical to
Rule 452). FINRA Rule 2251, which applies to brokers that are members of the
NASDAQ exchange, does not provide substantive guidance regarding whether
a member may vote proxies it does not beneficially own, but provides that “a
member may give a proxy to vote any stock pursuant to the rules of any national
securities exchange of which it is a member provided that the records of the
member clearly indicate the procedure it is following.” Fin. Indus.
Regulatory Auth. Manual, Rule 2251 (2016), http://finra.complinet.
com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8834 [http://perma.cc
/2X5M-L4VN].
These include the company’s annual report and proxy statement, which
includes disclosure required by the Exchange Act about the matters to be voted
on, and the proxy card, to be sent in to the company to give a proxy to vote the
shares.
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instructions.36 If the beneficial owner receives a signed proxy form, they can
vote by submitting it to the corporation, and the broker has no further role
in the voting of the proxy. If the beneficial owner receives a request for
voting instructions, they vote by returning instructions to the broker by the
tenth day before the company’s meeting, and the broker votes the shares as
directed by the beneficial owner.37 The question of broker discretionary
voting arises in the situation where the broker has not received voting
instructions by this deadline.
Broker discretionary voting is important because many shareholders—
especially retail investors—do not instruct brokers how to vote their shares.
Political scientists have long observed that it is not economically rational for
individuals to vote in political elections,38 since acquiring information to
vote is costly and the likelihood of an individual influencing the outcome of
an election is vanishingly small. Shareholder proxy votes exacerbate this
problem: it is even less rational for a shareholder to vote. Because
shareholder votes are weighted by the number of shares held, it is even less
likely that an individual shareholder will influence the outcome of a
shareholder vote.39 Furthermore, the specialized nature of corporate
governance matters makes it more difficult for most individuals to gather

36

37
38

39

N.Y. Stock. Exch. Inc., supra note 3, R. 451. If the proxy solicitation
material is transmitted to the beneficial owner or its adviser twenty-five days or
more before the meeting, the statement must state that the proxy may be given
fifteen days before the meeting at the discretion of the owner of record of the
stock.
NYSE Rule 452 supra note 3; see also NYSE Rule 452.10, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,
65 J. Pol. Econ. 135, 147 (1957) (“Therefore, we reach the startling
conclusion that it is irrational for most citizens to acquire political information
for purposes of voting.”).
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L.
Rev. 520 (1990); Christopher Gulinello, The Retail-Investor Vote: Mobilizing
Rationally Apathetic Shareholders To Preserve or Challenge the Board’s
Presumption of Authority, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 547 (2010); Yaron Nili & Kobi
Kastiel, In Search of “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’
Apathy, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 56 (2016).
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information about how to vote. Shareholder voting is also less likely to have
expressive significance than voting as a citizen.40
Due to the fact that few individual investors vote, uninstructed broker
votes represent a substantial number of shares at many companies. For my
sample, the average level of uninstructed broker votes was 10.1% of
outstanding shares. Figure 2 below sets out the distribution of broker votes
for director elections from 2012 to 2014 for the companies in my sample.41
Figure 2: Uninstructed Broker Votes in Director Elections of
U.S. Russell 3000 Companies, 2012-2014
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Cf. Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, Voter Choice Evaluating Political
Alternatives, 28 Am. Behav. Scientist 185 (1984) (setting out a formal
theory of voting other than by interest). This notion is further explored in
Geoffrey Brennan & Loren E. Lomasky, Democracy and
Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference (1993).
The sample is those companies disclosing broker non-votes for annual elections
between 2012 and 2014.
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C. Broker Voting Rules
1. Rule 452
Discretionary broker voting is governed by NYSE Rule 452. The rule
provides that a broker that has sent proxy materials to the beneficial owner
of shares and has not received instructions on voting the shares by the
deadline:
may give or authorize the giving of a proxy to [vote]
such stock, provided the person in the member
organization giving or authorizing the giving of the
proxy has no knowledge of any contest as to the
action to be taken at the meeting and provided such
action is adequately disclosed to stockholders and
does not include authorization for a merger,
consolidation or any other matter which may affect
substantially the rights or privileges of such stock.42
The supplementary materials to Rule 452 give further guidance as to
when brokers are not permitted to vote without instructions from the
beneficial owner, and list 21 matters on which brokers are not permitted to
vote discretionarily. These include contested proposals, shareholder
proposals opposed by management, proposals relating to mergers, proposals
involving appraisal rights, preemptive rights, or voting provisions, proposals
relating to executive compensation, and proposals for the election of
directors.43 Rule 452 reflects a concern about the distortive effects of broker
voting, based on the widely held understanding that brokers vote
overwhelmingly in the manner recommended by directors.44 The rule

42
43

44

NYSE Rule 452, supra note 3; see also NYSE Rule 452.10, supra note 3.
NYSE Rule 452.11 (listing “when member organization may not vote without
customer instructions”).
See Report and Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock
Exchange, Sec. & Exchange Commission 14 (June 5, 2006) [hereinafter
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therefore prohibits broker voting in situations where there is most concern
about potential distortion—issues where there is likely to be divergence
between what managers recommend (and what brokers are likely to
support) and what shareholders might prefer—such as mergers or
contested elections.
2. 2003 and 2010 Amendments to Rule 452
Since the precursor to Rule 452 was adopted in 1937,45 the matters on
which brokers are permitted to vote discretionarily have changed several
times. The most recent of these changes, in 2003 and 2010, help explain the
rationale for the changes made in the broker voting change.
In 2003, following the implementation of the requirement for
shareholders to approve equity compensation plans, Rule 452 was amended
to prevent broker discretionary voting on equity compensation plans.46 In
approving the rule change, the SEC considered the importance of ensuring
that votes on executive compensation matters reflect the views of beneficial
shareholders and concluded that the amendments served to protect
shareholders and were in the public interest.47
Following the implementation of the 2003 changes, the SEC created a
“Proxy Working Group”48 to review the rules regulating the proxy voting

45
46
47
48

Proxy Working Group Report], http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/
default/files/NYSE%20Proxy%20Working%20Grp%20Rpt%206-5-2006.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L74A-Z2FD]; see also Jennifer Bethel & Stuart Gillan, The
Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31
Fin. Mgmt. 29 (2002) (documenting this phenomenon).
See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 7.
See Release No. 34-48108, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995 (June 30, 2003)..
See id. at 40,008-09.
The Proxy Working Group included representatives of a number of
corporations, institutional investors, and attorneys, and their sessions were also
attended by representatives of the SEC, the NYSE, and the National
Association of Securities Dealers, the predecessor of the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
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process, and in particular, Rule 452.49 The Proxy Working Group
recognized the potentially distorting effect of broker votes:
[T]he problem with broker voting is that it allows
someone (i.e. the broker) who does not have an
economic interest in the corporation the
opportunity to vote on the corporation’s business.
A second problem is that historically brokers have
generally cast uninstructed shares overwhelmingly
in support of the board’s recommendations, which
provides a significant advantage to the incumbent
board in director elections and other matters.50
The Proxy Working Group concluded that, in the interests of “better
corporate governance and transparency of the election process,” broker
voting on uncontested elections should be eliminated.51
The Dodd Frank Act contained a provision requiring exchanges to
prevent their members from making uninstructed votes on elections of
directors or executive compensation matters, or any other significant matter
as determined by the SEC.52 The SEC subsequently approved amendments
put forward by the NYSE to prevent brokers from voting uninstructed
shares in director elections, effective January 1, 2010. In approving the
amendments, the SEC concluded that the rules would “better enfranchise
shareholders, and thereby enhance corporate governance and
accountability” and would “protect investors and the public interest.”53
The SEC subsequently approved NYSE rules prohibiting uninstructed

49

See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 1.
Id. at 14.
51
Id. at 15.
52
. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1906-07 (2010) (amending Section 6(b)(10) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
53
Release No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293 (July 1, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 SEC
Release].
50
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broker voting on executive compensation matters in September 2010,
concluding that “the proposal will further investor protection and the public
interest” and “should enhance corporate governance and accountability to
shareholders.”54 For these and other votes on which brokers do not vote
uninstructed shares, the number of uninstructed shares not voting is
required to be disclosed in the company’s election results as “broker nonvotes.”55
The 2003 and 2010 amendments to the NYSE rules followed a formal
process for notice and comment. Amendments to NYSE rules (and those of
other exchanges) are governed by Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 19b-4 of the General Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder.
These set out comprehensive requirements for proposed amendments of
exchange rules, including that the proposed rule be filed in the Federal
Register, and that public comments be requested56 so that the public have a
chance to provide meaningful comment on the proposal.57 The SEC must
consider the public comments and determine whether the rule satisfies the
requirements of the Exchange Act and rules, including being designed “in
general, to protect investors and the public interest.”58 The proposed
amendments therefore had detailed explanatory materials, public
comment,59 and lengthy consideration of the rules and the comments by the

54

See Release 34-62874, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,152 (Sept. 15, 2010) [hereinafter 2010
SEC Release].
55
. See Form 8-K Current Report, Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Item 5.07(b), Sec. & Exchange Commission
[hereinafter
Form
8-K
Current
Report],
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SP9DR36X].
56
See Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012); Form 19b-4
of the Exchange Act Rules, Sec. & Exchange Commission [hereinafter
Form
19-4],
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form19b-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9K9B-4GCS].
57
See Form 19b-4, supra note 56, at 2.
58
See Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2012).
59
With respect to the 2009 SEC Release, 153 comment letters were received and
reviewed. See 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,293.
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SEC, on the basis of which the SEC determined the rules had the effect of
protecting investors and the public interest.
3. Information Memorandum 12-4
The change in broker voting, which is the subject of this Article, took
place on January 25, 2012. On that date, the NYSE released Information
Memorandum 12-460 announcing that it would no longer treat certain
corporate governance matters as “Broker May Vote” for the purposes of
Rule 452. The announcement stated that “[m]ore recently, the approach to
broker voting of uninstructed shares has narrowed through changes in
[NYSE] rules as well as through legislative action,” and noted the
restrictions on broker voting for director elections and executive
compensation. It then continued:
In light of these and other recent congressional and
public policy trends disfavoring broker voting of
uninstructed shares, the [NYSE] has determined
that it will no longer continue its previous approach
under Rule 452 of allowing member organizations
to vote on such proposals without specific client
instructions. Accordingly, proposals that the
[NYSE] previously ruled as “Broker May Vote”
including, for example, proposals to de-stagger the
board of directors, majority voting in the election of
directors, eliminating supermajority voting
requirements, providing for the use of consents,
providing rights to call a special meeting, and
certain types of anti-takeover provision overrides,
that are included on proxy statements going

60

Information Memorandum 12-4: Application of Rule 452 to Certain Types of
Corporate Governance Proxy Proposals, N.Y. Stock Exch. (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/ruleinterpretations/2012/12-4.pdf [http://perma.cc/F436-QND5].
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forward will be treated as “Broker May Not Vote”
matters.61
As a result, since January 25, 2012,62 brokers have no longer been able to
vote uninstructed shares on charter amendments, as well as bylaw
amendments and other corporate governance proposals.63
In contrast to the previous broker voting changes to which it refers,
Information Memorandum 12-4 did not follow the thorough rulemaking
procedure contemplated by the Exchange Act.64 It was two pages in length,
and 394 words. It gave very little explanation of the reasoning behind the
changes it implemented, or consideration of their potential effects. There
was no advanced notice of the changes in the broker voting change, nor any
ability to publicly comment. There was no public consideration of the rule
change by the SEC, and no conclusions were drawn as to whether the rule
change would protect investors and the public interest.65 These procedural

61
62

63

64

65

Information Memorandum 12-4, supra note 60.
The broker voting change does not indicate a phase-in period or start date. It
does indicate that it applies to proposals “that are included on proxy statements
going forward.” A number of companies that had filed proxy statements prior
to January 25, 2012 for meetings that took place after that date that included
charter amendments did not separate broker votes. The last of these meetings,
that of Qualcomm Incorporated, took place on March 6, 2012. See Current
Report (Form 8-K), Qualcomm Inc. (Mar. 9, 2015).
Although all of the examples listed in the broker voting change are amendments
that reduce takeover defenses from subsequent amendment proposals where
broker votes have been excluded, it appears to have been interpreted to also
apply to other kinds of corporate governance amendments, such as ones that
put in place takeover defenses.
Section 19 of the Exchange Act permits a proposed rule change to avoid the
normal process if designed by the exchange as “constituting a stated policy,
practice, or interpretation with respect to the meaning, administration, or
enforcement of an existing rule of the self-regulatory organization.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(b)(3)(A) (2012).
Interviews conducted with NYSE and SEC officials who held relevant positions
at the time of the broker voting change suggest that the SEC preferred that the
NYSE take this policy change approach, rather than propose a rule change, with
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shortcomings may explain why the consequences described in Part II, and
the broader effects described in Part III, were not anticipated and avoided.66

II. Consequences of the Broker Voting Changes
This Part develops a theory for assessing the consequences of the broker
voting change. The treatment of uninstructed broker voting can distort the
outcome of shareholder votes in two ways—“distorted pass” results where
uninstructed broker voting is permitted, and “distorted fail” results where
uninstructed broker voting is not permitted. The main consequences of
distorted fails are frozen charters: many companies are now unable to amend
their charters because of the broker voting change. There are also two
related consequences—bylaws that are unamendable by shareholders, and
a newfound ability by insiders to wield a veto. All of these consequences
reduce shareholder welfare, the opposite effect of that which the broker
voting change intended. By contrast, the positive effect of the broker voting
change—preventing distorted pass results—has had a limited impact on
shareholder welfare.67

66

67

the concomitant procedural requirements described above (on file with the Yale
Journal on Regulation).
In an interview with the author, a senior official at the SEC at the time of the
broker voting change made clear that the SEC did not consider the effect of the
change on supermajorities, but approved of the broker voting change on the
principle that preventing broker voting improved the integrity of voting (notes
of interview by the author with former SEC Official, on file with the Yale
Journal on Regulation).
The issues I am discussing in this Part are separate from those discussed in the
existing literature on the problem of distortions and the prevention of efficient
changes that come from manager control of charter amendments. See, e.g.,
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 833 (2005); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments 102 Harv. L.
Rev. 1820 (1989).
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A. Broker Voting Distortions
Broker voting can cause distortions if brokers vote differently than if the
beneficial owners voted themselves. If shareholders of all shares held by
brokers gave voting instructions, there would be no distortion. However, if
shareholders do not give voting instructions, there will undoubtedly be some
divergence between the actual vote and the preferences of those
shareholders.68
To illustrate, assume that the proportion of outstanding shares held by
shareholders in favor of a proposal is 60%, and that holders of 15% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation do not give voting instructions to their
broker.69 Consider first the situation where brokers are permitted to vote
uninstructed shares. Consistent with the evidence and widely held views
that brokers vote uninstructed shares overwhelmingly as directors
recommend,70 I will assume—for the simplicity of the example—that
brokers vote 100% of uninstructed shares, following director
recommendations, in favor of management proposals.71 15% of the shares of
the company will therefore be voted by brokers in favor of the proposal.
However, had the shareholders themselves voted, only 60% of that 15%, or
9% of the outstanding shares, would have voted in favor. As a result, broker
voting has positively distorted the total vote by 6%. Consider now the
situation where broker voting is not permitted. Now none of the

68

69

70
71

It can be argued that because shareholders do not vote, they must prefer to
abstain. Because the treatment of broker non-votes is akin to an abstain vote,
there is therefore no distortion. However, just because a shareholder makes a
rational decision not to vote (for instance, because the cost of informing
themselves about the proposal exceeds the likely effect of their vote if they are
a small shareholder) does not mean that the shareholder would not prefer that
the proposal either pass or fail.
Let us further assume, here and throughout the examples in this section, that
support for the proposal is uniformly distributed among those shareholders that
vote and those that do not instruct their broker how to vote.
See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
Almost all director recommendations are in favor of management proposals.
For a discussion of why this is the case, and data on the small number of
exceptions, see infra Section V.D.
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uninstructed shares are voted in favor of the proposal. As a result,
prohibiting broker voting has negatively distorted the total vote by 9%.
However, more important than the vote tally is the outcome of the vote,
which is binary—if the proposal receives more votes than the vote
requirement, the proposal will pass; otherwise it will fail. This binary
outcome can be distorted in two different ways, analogous to the analytical
concepts of a “false positive” and a “false negative.” Either a proposal may
not have sufficient support to pass if undistorted, but distortive broker
voting could cause it to pass (which I term a “distorted pass”); or a proposal
would have sufficient support to pass if undistorted, but a distortive lack of
broker voting could cause it to fail (which I term a “distorted fail”). Given
the evidence that brokers vote overwhelmingly as directors recommend,
broker voting can only be distortive in the direction of director
recommendations—which are almost exclusively in favor of charter and
bylaw amendments.72 As a result, permitting broker voting can cause a
distorted pass in circumstances where shareholders would prefer that the
proposal fail but broker votes increase the vote beyond the vote required and
cause the proposal to pass. In contrast, if shareholders preferred the
proposal to pass and broker votes increased the vote in favor, the proposal
would still pass, and there would be no distortion in the outcome. To
illustrate, assume that a proposal is supported by shareholders holding 45%
of outstanding shares and requires 50% to pass. If the outcome is not
distorted, the proposal will fail. However, if shareholders of 15% of
outstanding shares do not instruct their broker how to vote, and their
brokers vote 100% of such shares in favor of the proposal, then the
percentage of outstanding shares in favor will be 85% × 45% + 15%, or 53.25%,
and the result will be a distorted pass.73

72

73

There are a very small number of cases where directors have not given a
recommendation or recommended against corporate governance proposals they
have approved. See discussion infra Section V.D and Table 11 for further
details.
As further discussed in Section IV.A below, the broker voting change was
implemented to avoid such a result.
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The converse is true where broker voting is not permitted. If
shareholders holding more than the required proportion of shares prefer
that a vote would pass, but the prohibition on brokers voting uninstructed
shares means that less than the required proportion is actually voted in
favor, then the result will be a distorted fail. To illustrate, assume that a
proposal is supported by shareholders holding 90% of outstanding shares,
and requires approval of 80% of outstanding shares to pass. If the outcome
is not distorted, the proposal will pass. However, if brokers are not
permitted to vote uninstructed shares, and if shareholders holding 15% of
outstanding shares do not instruct their broker how to vote, then the
percentage of shares in favor will be 0.85% × 90%, or 76.5%, and the result
will be a “distorted fail.”
Following from this analysis, the broker voting change, in disallowing
broker votes, has eliminated the possibility of distorted passes, but created
the possibility for distorted fails. Sections II.B and II.C consider these two
kinds of consequences.
B. Distorted Fails
1. Frozen Charters
The most significant distorted fail outcomes from the broker voting
change are frozen charters. Broker votes represent, on average, 10.4% of the
outstanding shares of corporations in my sample. For many corporations,
particularly those with high supermajority requirements for certain charter
amendments, turnout at annual meetings is such that the corporations are
unable to reach those requirements without broker votes. Therefore, as a
result of the broker voting change, those corporations are no longer able to
amend certain parts of their charters, even where directors and shareholders
strongly support such amendments. Their charters are frozen.
Although the great majority of charter amendments that go to a vote
pass, a significant number of companies have failed in their attempts to
amend their charters since the broker voting change came into effect. Of the
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645 proposals to amend corporate charters put forward by corporations74
between 2012 and 2014, 121 (19% of the total) have failed. Of those, 82 (13%
of the total) have failed despite receiving greater than 90% of the votes cast.75
The charters of these companies are frozen. These charter amendments
generally related to the removal of takeover protections,76 such as
declassification of the board or reductions in supermajority requirements to
amend the company’s charter or bylaws or take other corporate action.77

74

75

76

77

This excludes shareholder proposals, as they cannot by themselves effect
amendments to charters, and since the overwhelming majority of them are
precatory, they generally do not by themselves effect changes to bylaws or
corporate governance policies.
Data for results discussed in this Section is drawn from the FactSet
TrueCourse, Inc. SharkRepellent.net Proxy Database. The FactSet
SharkRepellent database contains data for approximately 4,000 U.S. public
companies, including those in the Russell 3000 indices. The Russell 3000 index
covers the largest 3,000 U.S. companies, which according to the publisher of
the index, Russell Investments, comprises 98% of the investable U.S. equity
market. As of May 29, 2014, the market capitalization of companies in the
Russell 3000 index ranged from $751 billion to $177 million. See Russell
Indexes,
Market
Capitalization
Ranges
(May
29,
2015),
http://www.russell.com/indexes/americas/toolsresources/reconstitution/market-capitalization-ranges.page
[http://perma.cc/XNG4-DT7N]. There are approximately 700 additional
companies covered by SharkRepellent, but because the database was originally
set up to track poison pills, many of the companies included are those that are
outside the Russell 3000 index but have poison pills. To avoid biasing my
sample, I limit my consideration here to companies in the Russell 3000 at the
time of the meeting where the proposal was considered. Since charter
amendment rules are governed by place of incorporation, I exclude non-U.S.
companies from my sample.
Many of the other proposals that failed (i.e., those that received less than 90%
support) were attempts to add takeover protections of the kind that are
generally disfavored by shareholders.
This can also be expressed algebraically. Throughout this article, I will use alpha
(α) to represent a proportion of outstanding shares, with a subscript to
represent the numerator—so αfor for the proportion of outstanding shares in
favor of a proposal, αbv for the proportion of outstanding shares that are
uninstructed broker votes (or “broker non-votes”), αto for the turnout as a
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A company will have a frozen charter if the percentage of votes cast in
favor of the proposal is greater than 90%,78 and the percentage of outstanding
shares voted in favor for the proposal is less than the percentage of
outstanding shares required for charter amendments.79
Take, for instance, the case of Teradata Corporation. At the
corporation’s 2012 annual meeting, the corporation put forward a
management proposal to declassify the corporation’s board of directors.80
The directors of the corporation recommended that shareholders vote in
favor of the resolution,81 and 99.6% of shareholders voting at the meeting
voted in favor of the proposal.82 However, the shares voted constituted only
75.9% of the shares outstanding as of the record date. The corporation’s

78

79
80

81
82

proportion of outstanding shares, and αreq for the proportion of outstanding
shares required for a vote to be approved. I will use beta (β) to represent a
proportion of votes cast (i.e., votes cast for, against and abstained, but not
including broker votes)—for instance, βfor for the proportion of votes cast in
favor. Where necessary, I will use theta (θ) for the raw number of votes—for
instance, θfor for the number of raw votes cast in favor.
Note that the choice of 90% is arbitrary. It is intended as a level to demonstrate
that an overwhelming proportion of shareholders are in favor of a proposal. As
the threshold is lowered, more of the 121 charter amendments that failed will be
defined as having frozen charters, although slightly lower proportions of those
are likely to have resulted from the broker voting changes.
Expressed algebraically: βfor > 0.9 and αfor < αreq.
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), Teradata Corp. 64 (Mar. 1,
2012). The corporation had previously received a shareholder proposal was put
forward by the State of North Carolina Equity Investment Fund Pooled Trust,
which was represented by the Shareholder Rights Project. See Outcomes of
Proposals for the 2012 Proxy Season, Shareholder Rts. Project (2012),
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/2012-declassification-proposals.shtml
[http://perma.cc/F2RE-W7D4]. The management proposal was put forward
pursuant to an agreement with the proponent, with the proponent agreeing to
withdraw the shareholder proposal if the corporation put forward the
management proposal. I served as the Shareholder Rights Project’s Associate
Director and assisted with the proposal, and with subsequent engagement with
Teradata.
Teradata Corp., supra note 80, at 5.
Current Report (Form 8-K), Teradata Corp. 2 (Apr. 26, 2012).
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charter required a vote of 80% of outstanding shares to amend the classified
board provision, so the proposal failed.
To what extent are these frozen charters due to the broker voting
change? Consistent with the views of the NYSE Proxy Working Group and
the evidence of Bethel and Gillan that brokers overwhelmingly follow
management recommendations, let us again assume that 100% of broker
votes would vote in accordance with management recommendations if they
are permitted to vote.83 Using this assumption, we can describe the
counterfactual situation where the broker voting change had not come into
effect. In that case, the percentage of outstanding shares in favor for each
company would be the percentage actually voted in favor plus the number
of broker votes. Therefore, a frozen charter will be the result of the broker
voting change where the percentage of shares outstanding voted for, plus
the percentage of broker votes is greater than the vote requirement.84
To illustrate, consider the example of the management proposal to
declassify the board of directors of Akamai Technologies, Inc. put forward
in 2013.85 The proposal received the support of 73.2% of the shares
outstanding. However, the voting requirement for the proposal to pass was
75%. Uninstructed broker votes represented 10.9% of shares outstanding.
Had those shares been voted in favor of the proposal by brokers, the total in
favor (αfor+ αbv) would have been 84.1%, and the proposal would have passed.
Table A.1 in Appendix A lists the companies where charter amendments
have failed since the broker voting change took effect (from 2012 to 2014).

83

84
85

In the event that there were no distortion from broker voting – for instance, if
there were proportional voting as discussed in Section V.C, the proportion
voting in favor would not be 100% of the broker vote, but the proportion of the
broker vote represented by βfor, so the proposal would pass if αfor + βfor.αbv > αreq.
Expressed algebraically: βfor > 0.9 and αfor < αreq and αfor + αbv > αreq.
See Current Report (Form 8-K), Akamai Technologies, Inc. (May 15,
2013). The proposal was brought pursuant to an agreement with the Illinois
State Board of Investment, which had previously submitted a shareholder
proposal to the corporation. The Illinois State Board of Investment was
represented by the Shareholder Rights Project. See Shareholder Rts.
Project, supra note 80.
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It reveals that, of the charter amendments voted on since the broker voting
change, in 54 of the 63 company-years86 (86%) where proposals failed despite
receiving at least 90% support, the company would have had at least one
proposal pass if the broker voting change had not applied.87
To put this into historical perspective, Figure 3, below, shows the
proportion of management proposals that failed despite receiving greater
than 90% support of votes cast from 2005 to 2014.

86

87

7 of the 50 companies listed in Panels 1-3 of Appendix A had proposals fail
despite receiving more than 90% support in two different years, and three
companies had proposals fail in all three years.
One of these companies, NYSE Euronext, one charter amendments that would
have failed and one that would have passed if the broker voting change had not
applied. Of the other companies, ModusLink Global Solutions, Inc. failed to
disclose the number of broker votes, and L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc.
claimed that a unanimous vote was required to approve the proposal. See
Current Report (Form 8-K), NYSE Euronext, (Apr. 25, 2013); Current
Report (Form 8-K), ModusLink Global Solutions, Inc. (Mar. 12,
2013); Current Report (Form 8-K), L-3 Communications Holdings,
Inc. (Apr. 30, 2013).
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Figure 3: Percentage of Companies Bringing Proposals
Where Proposals Failed Despite Receiving >90% Shareholder Support
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The average percentage of companies with proposals receiving 90%
support that had proposals fail from 2005 to 2011 was 2.7%. Had broker
votes been permitted from 2012 to 2014, I estimate that an average of 2.8%
of companies with proposals receiving 90% support would have failed during
that period. However, without broker votes, the actual average jumped to
13.1% over that period.
Another way of examining the effect of the broker voting change on
frozen charters is to consider whether the likelihood of failure for proposals
increased following the implementation of the rule. A regression (described
in Appendix B) of whether charter amendments pass or fail, dependent on
whether the vote took place after the broker voting change, shows that the
timing of the vote is strongly significant (at the 1% level) in determining the
probability of the vote failing, and that the likelihood of a proposal failing
increased by 4.9% after the broker voting change came into effect.
These results demonstrate that the broker voting change had a
significant and economically meaningful impact on both the likelihood of
amendment proposals failing and on the number of amendment proposals
that have actually failed.
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2. Shareholder-Unamendable Bylaws
So far, the discussion has focused on the effect of the broker voting
change on charter amendments. The rule change also applies to bylaw
amendments, which differ from charter amendments in several important
respects.
While board approval is necessary to amend a charter,88 state law
permits the bylaws of corporations to be amended by action of shareholders,
without the approval of the board.89 A significant number of corporations
have bylaws that can be also amended by the board of directors without a
vote of shareholders.90 Bylaws therefore provide protection for shareholders
in the event of a disagreement between the shareholders and directors
regarding whether a certain bylaw amendment is in the best interests of
shareholders.91 However, in the same way that the broker voting change has
resulted in shareholders being unable to approve charter amendments, it has
also resulted in shareholders of many corporations being unable to amend
bylaws amendments.
Take, for example, the case of insurance company Cigna Corporation.
The corporation has a classified board as stipulated in the bylaws of the

88
89
90

91

See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 241.
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(a).
See, e.g., Monsanto Co., Amended and Restated Bylaws § 67 (Jan. 11, 2016)
(requiring a vote of 70% of outstanding shares to amend the bylaws, but allowing
amendment by the vote of a majority of the Board of Directors). A notable
exception in Delaware is for bylaw provisions classifying the board of the
corporation, which can only be added upon a vote of stockholders of the
corporation. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(b).
In practice, instances of shareholders attempting to unilaterally amend the
bylaws of a corporation are rare. Only 10 shareholder proposals submitted from
2012 to 2014 (0.7% of shareholder proposals submitted during that period) were
binding bylaw proposals. See Rajeev Kumar Georgeson, Annual
Corporate Governance Review 14, 22 (2014). For a discussion of
the reasons why this is the case, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private
Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 Bus. Lawyer 329 (2010).
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corporation. Following receipt of a shareholder proposal,92 the corporation
put forward a management proposal to amend the bylaws of the corporation
to declassify the board of directors at its 2012 annual meeting.93 The board
of directors of the corporation made no recommendation on the proposal,
although it stated that it “continues to believe that the classified board
structure has been and remains in the best interests of the Company and its
shareholders.”94 95% of the shares voted at the meeting were in favor of the
proposal.95 However, these constituted only 72% of the outstanding shares
of the corporation. A vote of 80% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation was necessary to amend the bylaw provision establishing the
classified board.96 9.2% of the outstanding shares were uninstructed broker
votes and did not vote at the meeting. After continued engagement with the
Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, including a second shareholder
proposal requesting declassification of the board,97 the directors of the
corporation exercised their power to amend the bylaws without the need for
shareholder approval to remove the classified board provision.98
Table A.4 in Appendix A lists the 10 companies where bylaw
amendments that received greater than 90% support of votes cast have failed
since the broker voting change came into effect, and shows that 9 of the 10
companies would have had their bylaw amendment pass if the broker voting
change had not applied. This represents a lower number than the number of
frozen charters because there are fewer bylaw amendments put forward for
shareholder approval than charter amendments. Furthermore, in some of

92

93
94
95
96
97

98

The shareholder proposal was put forward by the Ohio Public Employees
Retirement System, which was represented by the Shareholder Rights Project.
See Shareholder Rts. Project, supra note 78.
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), Cigna Corp. 67 (Mar. 16, 2012).
Id.
Current Report (Form 8-K), Cigna Corp. 2 (Apr. 25, 2012).
See Amended and Restated Bylaws, Cigna Corp. 20 (Oct. 26, 2010).
The Shareholder Rights Project represented the Ohio Public Employees
Retirement System in connection with this engagement and the shareholder
proposal. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Towards the Declassification of S&P 500
Boards, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 157, 178 (2013).
Current Report (Form 8-K), Cigna Corp. 2 (Dec. 12, 2012).
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those cases, boards could also act unilaterally to amend the bylaws.
However, as above, the effect has been to reduce the number of corporate
governance changes preferred by shareholders.
3. Insider Vetoes
Just as the broker voting change has made it impossible to amend parts
of the charters of many corporations, it has also granted insiders a new veto
power—i.e., situations in which all of the shareholders could formerly have
amended the charter if they so desired, but whereby an insider block can
now prevent the company from amending its charter.
To illustrate, consider the case of Cerner Corporation. At its 2013
annual meeting of shareholders, the company put forward a management
proposal to amend its charter to declassify its board of directors.99 The
company had in place a supermajority requirement requiring a vote of 80%
of outstanding shares to amend the relevant provision of its charter. The
proposal received the support of 70% of shares outstanding (representing
86% of the votes cast) and failed.100 About 7.5% of shares outstanding were
uninstructed broker shares, which did not vote. With uninstructed brokers
prohibited from voting, there were only 93% of the shares outstanding
available to vote. According to its 2013 proxy statement, the officers and
directors of Cerner held 14% of the outstanding shares of the corporation.101
If all of the directors and officers opposed an amendment proposal, even if
all other shareholders voted in favor of the proposal, it could receive at most
79% of the vote, insufficient to amend the relevant provisions of the charter.
As a result of the broker voting change, directors and officers had a veto over
amendments to those provisions of the charter.
Let us assume that insiders generally vote, and that their votes are
therefore included in shareholder turnout. Insiders will have a veto if a vote
99

100
101

See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), Cerner Corp. (Apr. 15, 2013).
This proposal resulted from engagement by a client represented by the
Shareholder Rights Project, discussed further at supra note 1.
See Current Report (Form 8-K), Cerner Corp. (May 24, 2013).
See Cerner Corp., supra note 99.
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will pass if they vote, but will not pass if they do not vote, i.e., shareholder
turnout is greater than the vote requirement, but shareholder turnout less
the proportion of shares held by insiders is less than the vote requirement.102
This will be the result of the broker voting change if the shareholder turnout
less the proportion of shares held by insiders plus uninstructed broker votes
would be greater than the vote requirement.103
The possibility of insiders vetoing charter amendments is especially
problematic for votes on proposals such as anti-takeover amendments,
where managements’ preferences may diverge acutely from the preferences
of most shareholders. Anti-takeover amendments represent a large
proportion of the charter amendment votes that fail despite receiving strong
shareholder support.104 It is possible that shareholders in general prefer to
amend the charter to remove anti-takeover defenses, as the threat of a
takeover may encourage management to perform more effectively, and
shareholders may benefit from the potential premium paid in the case of a
takeover.105 Consequently, shareholder proposals put forward in 2014
requesting that companies remove classified boards, a key takeover defense,
received average support of 81% of votes cast.106 However, insiders—
managers—are likely to prefer not to amend such charter provisions, for
corresponding reasons—the threat of a takeover that might lead to their
replacement will reduce their job security, and put more pressure on them
to perform than they may otherwise prefer. In these cases, an insider veto

102
103
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106

αto > αreq and αto - αins < αreq.
αto > αreq and αto - αins < αreq and αto - αins + αbv > αreq.
In my dataset, 88.7% of the charter amendment proposals that failed despite
receiving more than 90% of votes cast were proposals to reduce takeover
protection.
See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
Pol. Econ. 110 (1965) (introducing the concept of a market for corporate
control); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983) (analyzing the
effects of takeovers); Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and
Consequences, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 21 (1988) (summarizing the evidence of the
effects of takeovers).
See Georgeson, supra note 91, at 20.
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would allow managers to stymie a charter amendment that would otherwise
be value-enhancing for the substantial majority of shareholders of the
company.
So far I have been describing the set of negative consequences of the
broker voting change’s elimination of broker voting, the distorted fail
results. I now turn to consider the positive effects the broker voting change
has had in eliminating distorted pass results.
C. Distorted Passes
As described in Part I, the broker voting change restricted broker voting
on corporate governance matters, such as charter amendments, based on a
concern that broker voting could distort the outcomes of shareholder votes
where shareholders disagree with management recommendations. In the
terminology coined in Section I.A, these are distorted pass results. In this
Section, I consider the positive consequences of the broker voting change in
eliminating such distorted pass proposals.
In order to evaluate this scenario, it is necessary to consider the
preferences of the shareholders as a whole, including those who hold their
own shares and do not vote, and those that hold their shares through a
broker and do not instruct their broker how to vote. Because non-voting
shareholders do not vote, their preferences are necessarily unknowable. It is
also difficult to gather data on whether the characteristics of non-voting
shareholders differ from other shareholders, and therefore whether their
preferences are likely to differ from other shareholders. In the absence of
any basis on which to believe otherwise, I will assume that the preferences
of shareholders that do not vote (and do not instruct their brokers to vote)
are the same as the preferences of the shareholders that do vote.107 As a

107

This is consistent with the discussion in Section I.B, which states that many
shareholders do not vote because it is not rational for them to gather information
regarding the vote. The assumption is consistent with the view that, if the group
of shareholders that do not vote had spent time to inform themselves about the
best voting outcome, the proportion of those shareholders that would vote in

39

Frozen Charters
result, I take the proportion of votes cast that are in favor of a proposal108 as
an indicator of the preferences of all shareholders with respect to the
proposal.
The criterion for determining whether a vote would have been positively
distorted by broker votes will vary between companies that have “shares
outstanding” and “votes cast” requirements. For a company with a vote
requirement that is a percentage of shares outstanding, a vote would be
distorted by broker votes if less than 50% of votes cast are in favor of the
proposal, but the votes cast in favor of the proposal plus broker votes would
be greater than the vote requirement.109
Table A.3 of Appendix A shows the nine proposals put forward from
2012 to 2014 that received support of less than 50% of votes cast. Of those
proposals, seven required a majority of votes cast for approval,110 and two
required a majority of outstanding shares. As Table A.3 shows, allowing

108

109

favor would tend towards the proportion of the shareholders that are well
informed about the vote that voted in favor.
This corresponds to the variable βfor. I include in “votes cast” votes to abstain,
as well as votes for and against.
In other words, βfor < 0.5 and αfor + αbv > αreq. For those companies that have a
vote requirement that is a percentage of votes cast, a vote would be distorted by
broker votes if less than 50% of votes cast are in favor of the proposal, and the
number of votes cast in favor and broker votes (as a proportion of all votes cast
and broker votes - βfor+bv) is greater than the vote required (βreq), i.e.: βfor <
0.5 and βfor+bv > βreq. Since adding broker votes changes the denominator as well
as the numerator of the percentage of votes cast, βfor+bv is calculated as the it
total number of votes cast in favor (θfor) plus the total number of broker votes
(θbv), divided by the total number of votes cast for (θfor), against (θag), abstained
(θab) and by brokers (θbv) For example:

βfor+bv = θ
110

θfor +θbv
for + θag +θab + θbv

.

Five proposals were to approve the use of a shareholder rights plan (i.e. poison
pill); because shareholder rights plans are not contained in the charter, they only
require the approval of a majority of votes cast. Green Plains Renewable Energy,
Inc. is an Iowa company, and Iowa follows the Model Business Corporation Act,
where the vote requirement to amend the company’s charter is a majority of
votes cast. See sources cited in supra note 18.
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broker voting would have distorted the outcome of only one of these
proposals, that of Pacific Sunwear of California, Inc. The proposal required
a majority of votes cast. 48% of votes cast were in favor of the proposal,
which failed. Had the 12% of outstanding shares held by brokers been voted
in favor of the proposal, 55% of votes cast would have been in favor, and the
proposal would have passed. Note that the percentage of votes cast was
already very close to 50%. In the other six instances, the vote was not close
enough to 50% for broker votes to have distorted the outcome. As a result,
it is difficult to conclude that the broker voting change has had a significant
effect in preventing distortion of shareholder voting on management
proposals.
The very small number of management proposals where a majority of
votes cast were against the proposal is to be expected. A management
proposal requires the approval of directors. Directors must believe that the
proposal is in the best interests of the company;111 this may be more difficult
to establish for those proposals that are widely opposed by shareholders. In
addition to their legal duty, bringing a management proposal is costly—
directors must spend time considering the proposal, often seek legal advice
regarding the proposal, and must approve disclosure regarding the proposal
for the proxy statement. The failure of a management proposal may also
have negative reputational costs for directors and managers.
As a result of these factors, directors are unlikely to put forward a
management proposal that they think is unlikely to succeed. In addition,
shareholders generally follow directors’ recommendations, unless they
have reason to believe that interests of directors differs from their own. One
such situation may occur with an amendment relating to takeover defenses,
where directors and managers may have self-interested reasons for their
recommendation. Consistent with this theory, all seven failing proposals
that received less than 50% support from shareholders were proposals to

111

See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (“[The] board of directors shall
adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its
advisability . . . .”).
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authorize takeover defenses.112 As a result of these factors, there are very
few management proposals that fail because of low levels of shareholder
support, and so the likely magnitude of the risk of distortion by the inclusion
of broker votes is extremely limited.
Figure 4 below shows the distribution of shareholder support for the 851
management proposals that were voted on at U.S.-incorporated Russell
3000 companies between 2012 and 2014.
Figure 4: Distribution of Shareholder Support for
Management Proposals 2012-2014
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As Figure 4 shows, most management proposals receive very high levels
of support—the median level of support was 98.6%. Only the seven

112

Well-advised corporations are likely to understand that, in the absence of a large
blockholder who is in favor of the proposal, the likelihood of such proposals
passing may be low and are less likely to bring a proposal. Six of the nine
companies—all except Cameron International Corporation, Healthcare Trust
of America, Inc., and Wynn Resorts Ltd.—are small capitalization companies
(outside the Russell 1000), and may have not have had access to high-quality
advice regarding the likelihood of success of the proposals.
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proposals listed in Table A.3 of Appendix A, 1.1% of the total, received
support of less than 50% of votes cast. Since proposals can only be distorted
if they receive less than 50% support, and the likelihood of receiving less than
50% support is extremely low, the chances of distortion occurring as a result
of broker voting are also extremely low.
A single management proposal since the broker voting change came into
effect could have resulted in distortion, that of Pacific Sunwear of
California, Inc. in 2012. In that case, the board of directors brought a
proposal to ratify a shareholder rights plan (commonly known as a poison
pill) that the board had adopted the previous year.113 The proposal did not
amend the charter or bylaws, and required only 50% of votes cast to be in
favor. The corporation had a number of significant blockholders, including
a shareholder with 29.8% of the voting power, a private equity fund with
19.9% of the voting power, which collectively appear to have been
instrumental in putting in place the poison pill, and a hedge fund with 14.7%
of the voting power, which appears to have been disadvantaged by the
poison pill.114 The directors, including representatives of the two largest
holders, recommended in favor of the proposal; ISS recommended against
the proposal. Shareholders representing 48.4% of the votes cast voted in
favor of the proposal, which failed.115 12.8% of the votes present at the
meeting were uninstructed broker votes, and did not vote. 116 Had even a
quarter of the broker shares been voted in favor of the proposal, it would
have passed.117

113
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See Definitive Proxy Statement, Pac. Sunwear of Cal. Inc. 23 (May 4,
2012).
Id. at 28.
Current Report (Form 8-K), Pac. Sunwear of Cal Inc. 2 (June 21, 2012).
Id.
After amending the poison pill to meet ISS’s guidelines, the corporation
resubmitted it for ratification at its 2013 annual meeting. See Definitive Proxy
Statement, Pac. Sunwear of Cal. Inc. 25 (Apr. 26, 2013). ISS
recommended in favor, and the proposal passed, receiving 96% of the votes cast.
See Current Report (Form 8-K), Pac. Sunwear of Cal. Inc. 2 (June 7,
2013).
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Pacific Sunwear’s potential distorted pass represents 0.12% of the
management proposals brought during this period. This is lower than the
chances of a company having its charter frozen by an order of magnitude,
and therefore the benefits of avoiding distorted passes are significantly
outweighed by the costs of the distorted fail effects of the broker voting
change.

III. Companies Affected by the Broker Voting
Changes
In Part II, I confined my analysis to amendments that have been brought
to a vote since the broker voting change was implemented. However, since
only a small proportion of companies have brought such proposals to a vote
(12% of my sample), the results presented in Part II underestimate the true
effects of the broker voting change. In this Part, I consider the effects of the
broker voting change on those companies that have not brought such a
proposal to a vote.
A. Frozen Charters
In circumstances where there has not yet been a charter amendment
proposed, we cannot be certain how an amendment would fare, or the effect
of the broker voting change on the likelihood of such an amendment.
However, we can be certain that a potential amendment would fail where,
even if all of the shareholders that voted had cast their votes in favor of the
amendment, those shareholders would still be insufficient to meet the
voting requirement necessary to amend the charter.118 This definition will
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In other words: αto < αreq. This is consistent with the analysis above, where I
used αfor < αreq and βfor > 0.9. Because αfor = αto × βfor, so the first condition is αto
× βfor < αreq. Since we are assuming βfor = 1, the first condition simplifies to αto <
αreq. Similarly, assuming that βfor = 1, the second condition, βfor > 0.9, is always
satisfied.
This assumes that the company has a “shares outstanding” standard to amend
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underestimate the number of frozen charters as defined above, as there may
be some amendments that would fail if they received 90% support, but would
pass if they received 100% support. The frozen charter will be the result of
the broker voting change if, in addition to this criterion, shareholder turnout
and uninstructed broker votes are greater than the vote required.119
To determine the number of frozen charters among companies that have
not yet had charter amendment proposals, and whether those are caused by
the broker voting change, I gather proxies for shareholder turnout,
uninstructed broker votes, and voting requirements for each U.S. company
in the Russell 3000 index. I determine applicable voting requirements from
whether the company has a supermajority provision to amend its charter or
bylaws, and if not, the default charter amendment requirement in its state
of incorporation.
To estimate likely shareholder turnout and broker votes for a potential
charter amendment, I use voting in director elections. Since Rule 452 was
amended to prevent uninstructed broker voting on director elections in
2010, corporations have been required to disclose broker vote/non-vote
figures for director elections.120
However, using these figures as estimators of turnout for a potential
charter amendment proposal presents two potential problems. Director
election turnout (and charter amendment turnout) may vary from year to
year. I therefore estimate the number of frozen charters in each year from
2010 to 2014. To be even more conservative, I also consider the number of
frozen charters assuming each company had their maximum turnout within
that period (and the corresponding number of uninstructed broker votes).

119
120

the relevant part of its charter. Though since almost all “votes cast” standards
require a majority of votes cast, if more than 90% of votes cast are in favor of a
proposal at such a company, the proposal will pass.
In other words: αto < αreq and αto + αbv > αreq.
See Form 8-K Current Report, supra note 55. However, a number of corporations
nonetheless disclose zero broker non-votes. Where this is an inaccurate
disclosure of a positive number of broker non-votes, they will not be picked up
by my method, which will therefore produce an underestimate of the number of
corporations affected by the broker voting change.
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A second problem in estimating turnout may occur if there is
systematically higher turnout for meetings with votes involving charter
amendments than for meetings without charter amendment votes.
Intuitively, it makes sense that if a company has an amendment proposal on
the ballot and is concerned that the amendment may fail, management of
the company may employ a proxy solicitor to try to get a greater number of
shareholders to vote. I examine this possibility at length in Appendix C, and
undertake a variety of tests to determine if this is the case. My analysis
shows that, between 2010 and 2014, director election turnout was not higher
at annual meetings where corporations also had corporate governance
proposals on their ballot.121 However, because there is intuitive and
anecdotal evidence122 to suggest that increases are possible (if not
widespread), I also test the number of frozen charters based on an arbitrary
assumption that corporations are able to increase turnout by 5%.
I limit my sample to companies that are currently in the Russell 3000
index.123 I exclude companies with missing turnout data. I exclude meetings
with contested elections, where shareholder votes may be split with
competing candidates. I eliminate companies where cumulative voting or
multiple classes of shares with different voting rights makes it difficult to
estimate likely shareholder amendment turnout.124 This leaves a sample of

121

122

123

124

As described in Appendix C, having a corporate governance proposal on the
ballot was actually associated with lower director election turnout.
According to FactSet SharkRepellent, one corporation, Apache Corporation,
put forward management proposals in 2013, 2014, and 2015. The proposals in
2013 and 2014 had turnout of 74.9% and 78.2%, respectively, insufficient to
satisfy the company’s 80% supermajority requirement, even with more than 98%
of votes cast in support each year. In 2015, the proposal received 83.4% turnout
and passed. This suggests that some corporations with frozen charters can,
through sustained effort, increase their turnout sufficiently to overcome frozen
charters. Apache Corporation increased its turnout by 4.5% from 2013 to 2014,
and by 6.6% from 2014 to 2015, an average of 5.5%.
For a discussion of the composition of the Russell 3000 index, see supra note 75
and accompanying text.
Although these companies are not identified as such in the SharkRepellent
database, I identify them as those where with significant variation in turnout

46

Frozen Charters
11,288 company years, or an average of 2,257.6 companies per year. My
results are set out in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Estimated Frozen Charters Resulting from
the Broker Voting Change (BVC)

%

Frozen
Charter
because of
BVC
with 5%
Inflation

%

Year

Total Companies

Frozen
Charter
Because of
BVC

2010

2,022

261

12.9%

254

12.6%

2011

2,155

302

14.0%

282

13.1%

2012

2,205

326

14.8%

282

12.8%

2013

2,310

312

13.5%

285

12.3%

2014

2,596

371

14.3%

353

13.6%

Max αto
2010-14

2,619

256

09.8%

233

08.9%

I estimate that, based on yearly data from 2010 to 2014, between 13% and
15% of U.S. companies have frozen charters as a result of the broker voting
change. Even on the most conservative assumptions—using the maximum
turnout between 2010 and 2014, I estimate that about 10% of U.S. companies
have frozen charters as a result of the broker voting change. The possibility
of increasing turnout by 5% decreases the number of frozen charters caused
by the broker voting change by a very small amount—the proportion of
companies with frozen charters remains between 12.6% and 13.6% based on
actual numbers, or 8.9% assuming the maximum turnout between 2010 and
2014.

among directors—which I evaluate as the standard deviation of director turnout
greater than 10% of the mean director turnout.
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B. Shareholder-Unamendable Bylaws
I use the same methodology as in Section III.A to determine the number
of corporations where the broker voting change has made it impossible for
shareholders to amend the bylaws of the corporation.125 The default
requirement in most states for a bylaw amendment is only a majority of votes
cast,126 but a majority of companies provide for supermajority requirements
for shareholder votes to amend certain bylaw provisions.127 The FactSet
SharkRepellent database provides data regarding supermajority
requirements for bylaw amendment. However, the database does not
differentiate between corporations that require a majority of outstanding
shares to amend certain bylaw provisions, and those that require a majority
of votes cast. To be conservative, I assume that all companies without a
supermajority require only a majority of votes cast. As a result, my analysis
is likely to significantly underestimate the number of companies with boardonly bylaw amendments. Table 3 below sets out my results.128

125

126
127

128

As before, I evaluate the number of companies where: αto < αreq and αto + αbv >
αreq. In this instance I use αreq to represent the vote required for the bylaw
amendment, rather than the charter amendment.
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109.
1,087 companies in my sample (41.9%) have supermajority provisions for
amending one or more provisions of their bylaws.
I do not include calculations based on a 5% inflation figure in Table 3 or Table 4,
as the inflation is predicated on the possibility that management would choose
to employ a proxy solicitor to increase turnout. In the situations described in
Section III.B and Section III.C, I am assuming that management prefers not to
amend the bylaws or charter; if they did, they could bring a bylaw amendment
themselves, or could refrain from exercising their veto over the amendment. If
management prefers not to amend the bylaws or charter, there would be no
reason for them to employ a proxy solicitor to increase turnout.
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Table 3: Bylaws Not Amendable by Shareholders as a result of
the Broker Voting Change (BVC)
Year

Total Companies

Bylaw Not
Amendable By
Shareholders
Because BVC

2010

2,022

173

8.6%

2011

2,155

193

9.0%

2012

2,205

209

9.5%

2013

2,310

192

8.3%

2014

2,596

239

9.2%

Max αto
2010-14

2,619

162

6.2%

%

Table 3 shows that, based on 2010 to 2014 data, the broker voting change
has made it impossible for shareholders to amend the bylaws of between
8.3% and 9.5% of U.S corporations, or 6.2% of U.S. corporations using the
most conservative estimate.
C. Insider Vetoes
As with frozen charters, it is possible to estimate the number of
companies where the broker voting change has given insiders a veto over
certain charter amendments. Based on the same simplifying assumption
that all shareholders support a particular resolution,129 insiders will have a
veto as a result of the broker voting change where turnout is greater than the
vote requirement, but turnout less the insider block is less than the vote
required, and turnout plus broker votes less the insider vote would be
greater than the vote required.130 I use the same methodology and data as

129
130

βfor = 1.
If αins represents the insider block, then: αto > αreq and αto - αins < αreq and αto αins + αbv > αreq.
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above, including insider holdings taken from the FactSet SharkRepellent
database. My results are shown in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Insider Veto As a Result of the Broker Voting Change (BVC)
Year

Total Companies

Insider Veto Because
of BVC

%

2010

2,022

135

6.7%

2011

2,155

166

7.7%

2012

2,205

170

7.7%

2013

2,310

170

7.4%

2014

2,596

209

8.1%

Max αto
2010-14

2,619

196

7.5%

As shown in Table 4, I estimate that the broker voting change has
resulted in insiders at between 6.7% and 8.1% of U.S. companies having a
potential veto over charter amendments, or 7.5% of companies using the
most conservative assumptions. Of course, since shareholder support for a
particular resolution will be less than 100%,131 there will be a greater set of
companies where the broker voting change has given insiders a de facto veto
over certain amendments.
D. Distorted Passes
In the same way that I extended my consideration of frozen charters to
the large majority of companies that have not had charter amendments go
to a vote, it is possible to consider the likelihood of potential distorted passes
for proposals that have not yet been voted on.
I find that 370 companies (16.6%) could potentially have a distorted pass
result. However, these are only potentially distortable companies. To
estimate the likely number of distorted passes, it is necessary to consider the
131

βfor < 1.
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level of support that would be necessary for the companies above to have
votes distorted, and the likelihood of those levels of support occurring. The
level of support necessary for the vote to be distorted will be a function of
the number of broker votes and the turnout for the vote. The lower the
number of broker votes as a proportion of the turnout, the closer the level of
support must be to 0.5 for the outcome to be distorted.132 Table 5 below
shows the distortable companies by the range of support at which they could
be distorted.
Table 5: Expected Number of Distorted Companies
Minimum
Support for
Distortion

Companies

Range of
Support for
Distortion

Likelihood of
Support in
Range

Expected Number of
distorted pass
Companies

45%-50%

244

45%-50%

0.4%

0.9

40%-45%

062

40%-50%

0.6%

0.4

35%-40%

030

35%-50%

0.9%

0.3

30%-35%

014

30%-50%

0.9%

0.1

20%-30%

008

20%-50%

0.9%

0.1

10%-20%

006

10%-50%

1.1%

0.1

00%-10%

006

00%-50%

1.1%

0.1

Total

370

132

1.8

For companies with outstanding shares requirements, rearranging the formula
above, we can see that:
βfor >

αreq - αbv
αto

.

For companies with votes cast requirements:
βfor >

βreq (θto +θbv) - θbv
θto
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Along with the breakdown of distortable companies by the minimum
level of support necessary for distortion, Table 5 also shows the likelihood
of proposal support being between that level and 0.5, based on the
proportion of all management proposals that received support in that range
from 2012 to 2014.133 By multiplying this likelihood by the number of
companies requiring that level of support, we can estimate the number of
companies that are likely to have a distorted pass outcome as a result of
broker votes. As Table 5 shows, only 1.8 companies, or 0.08% of the
companies in my sample, can be expected to have a distorted pass outcomes
as a result of broker votes.
This result reflects the low number of management proposals that are
likely to receive less than 50% of shareholder support brought by directors.
However, if management were to begin bringing forward more unpopular
proposals, the number of potential distorted pass proposals would also
change. Since such a possibility cannot be ruled out, any solution to the
problem of distortion should minimize the risk of distorted passes as well as
reducing the incidence of distorted fails.

IV. Evaluating the Broker Voting Changes
I turn now to consider the broker voting change from a normative
perspective. I evaluate the broker voting change from several frames of
reference. First, consistent with its own goals, I consider the broker voting
change from an investor perspective. Second, I consider the broker voting
change from a firm value perspective. Third, I consider the broker voting
change from the perspective of the contractarian theory that underlies
corporate law. Fourth, I consider the broker voting change from the

133

This assumes that the likelihood of that level of support is independent of the
“distortability” of the company submitting the proposal. In reality, companies
that are distortable may be slightly more likely to put forward proposals that
have lower levels of support, and therefore the estimates in Table 5 may
underestimate the level of expected distortion, though likely by less than an
order of magnitude.
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perspective of directors and managers. I conclude with some words about
the procedure by which the broker voting change was put in place.
A. The Investor Perspective
Because the broker voting change is so short—about half a page of
text—it does not explicitly set out the reasons underlying its prohibition on
uninstructed broker voting for certain corporate governance proposals.
Instead, it references recent “changes in [NYSE] rules as well as through
legislative action,” gives the example of the 2010 prohibition on broker
voting of uninstructed shares in the election of directors and executive
compensation matters, and indicates that the changes are being made “in
light of these and other recent congressional and public policy trends
disfavoring broker voting of uninstructed shares.”134 To understand the
goals of the broker voting change, it is therefore necessary to refer to the
reasons underlying the 2010 changes prohibiting uninstructed broker voting
on director elections and executive compensation. The underlying
rationales cited in the SEC orders approving the 2010 prohibitions on
uninstructed broker voting on director elections and broker voting on
executive compensation were to “better enfranchise shareholders”135 and
thereby “further investor protection and the public interest”136 and
“enhance corporate governance and accountability to shareholders.”137 I
therefore consider first how the broker voting change fares against its own
implicit goal of investor protection.
Taking into account the consequences of the broker voting change
outlined in Parts II and III, how does the broker voting change fare when

134
135
136
137

See Information Memorandum 12-4, supra note 60, at 1.
See 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,296.
See 2010 SEC Release, supra note 54, at 56,154.
See id. at 9; see also 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,296 n.34 (arguing
also that the 2009 change to the broker voting rules would “enhance corporate
governance and accountability”). This is also consistent with statements made
during interviews by NYSE and SEC staff members at the time the broker
voting change was adopted (interview notes on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation).
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evaluated against these aims? Here it is necessary to weigh the benefits of
the broker voting change for investors in eliminating distorted pass results,
with its costs to investors in causing distorted fail outcomes for proposals
that investors consider to be value enhancing. As Part II shows, the number
of distorted fail outcomes resulting from the broker voting change,
particularly frozen charters, clearly outweighs the small number of distorted
pass results that the broker voting change has prevented. And on a
prospective basis, as described in Part III, the number of companies that are
likely to have frozen charters without broker voting, and other distorted fail
outcomes that likely resulted from the elimination of broker voting, clearly
outweigh the small number of companies where permitting broker voting
could result in distorted pass outcomes.138 By freezing charters, the broker
voting change has disenfranchised shareholders. To the extent that these
shareholders believe that charter amendments they vote on would enhance
corporate governance and accountability to shareholders, the broker voting
change has prevented such enhancement and accountability. As Sections
II.B and II.C illustrate, there are other additional ways in which, rather than
protecting shareholders from distortion in favor of insiders, the broker
voting change has actually harmed investors—by giving certain insiders
veto power over amendments that shareholders may believe to be in their
interest, and by taking away shareholders’ ability to amend certain bylaws.
The most obvious counterargument in favor of the broker voting change
is that broker voting is empty voting; brokers do not have any economic
interest in the shares they vote, and therefore should not be controlling how
those shares are voted.139 However, this argument against broker voting is
like the old saw, variously attributed, that it might work in practice, but how
does it work in theory? Voting by an actor without an economic interest is
problematic not because it violates any established rule of corporate law.

138

139

This assumes that the distribution of support for corporate governance
proposals would remain constant.
Indeed, this argument was put forward in defense of the broker voting rule
change by a former SEC official in an interview with the author. See interview
with former SEC Official (on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
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Indeed, many investors vote through intermediaries such as investment
advisers that may not have any economic interest in the shares that they are
responsible for buying and voting. Instead, exercising voting rights without
having an economic interest is considered undesirable because of the
outcomes it is prone to produce—the voting actor influencing outcomes in
their own interest, rather than the interests of their beneficiary.140 But—in
contrast to voting on other matters, like director elections and executive
compensation—the nature of voting on management proposals means that
there are few, if any, circumstances where there may be a potential
divergence between brokers’ interests and the interests of the beneficial
owners of the shares.
As outlined above, charter amendment votes differ in two important
respects from the director elections and executive compensation votes that
the broker voting change refers to. First, there is a greater possibility for a
divergence between director recommendations and shareholder
preferences in director elections or executive compensation votes than in
charter amendments. Second, the default rule for most charter amendments
is not with reference to votes cast, but to shares outstanding.141 As was
explained in Part I above, many corporations have supermajority
requirements requiring the approval of a higher proportion of shares
outstanding. With a votes cast standard, preventing uninstructed broker
voting will have a limited effect on the chance of the proposal passing, as
broker votes will be eliminated from both the numerator and denominator
of the proportion of votes cast. Indeed, Akyol, Raff, and Verwijmeren found
that the 2010 amendments to Rule 452 eliminating uninstructed broker
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See, e.g., The 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,296, (indicating that the
proposed rule “should better enfranchise shareholders by helping assure that
votes . . . are determined by those with an economic interest in the company”
(footnote omitted)).
This excludes those companies incorporated in states governed by MBCAbased statutes that have not overridden the default amendment rule in those
states, though as discussed in Section III.A, these represent only 5% of the
sample I consider.
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voting for director elections did not decrease approval rates for directors.142
However, as demonstrated by the number of frozen charters observed in
Part II above, with a shares outstanding standard, preventing broker voting
will have a much greater impact on the likelihood of a proposal passing. It
was therefore inapposite to apply reasoning from recent changes to Rule 452
to uninstructed broker voting on corporate governance proposals.
B. The Firm Value Perspective
The consequences of the broker voting change have been to prevent
changes in the corporation’s governance. Given that they garnered the
support of managers, directors, and shareholders, it is likely that these
changes are value-enhancing for the corporation and its shareholders.143
However, in a number of these corporations, frozen charters have prevented
the corporation from making such amendments. To the extent this is the
result of the broker voting change, the rule change has prevented the
maximization of firm value.
An argument could be made that charter amendments of the kind
prevented by frozen charters are not value enhancing, and that by
preventing them, the broker voting change has maximized firm value.
Indeed, one side of an active debate in corporate law and financial
economics holds that removing anti-takeover devices (as most charter
amendments seek to do) reduces firm value.144 However, that would imply
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See Ali C. Akyol et al., supra note 10, at 17 (“[W]e observe no decrease in
approval rates after the change in Rule 452. In fact, the increase in approval
rates in annual meetings after 2009 is statistically significant at the 1% level.”).
Indeed, as directors are required to declare that such proposals are in the best
interests of the company, and are bound by fiduciary duties, this is a strong
presumption.
See, e.g., Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value,
Revisited
(Mar.
14,
2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2364165
[https://perma.cc/QU8R-LWMY]. For the contrary view, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. Fin. Econ.
409 (2005); Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial
Entrenchment, 83 J. Fin. Econ. 501 (2007).
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that the directors that propose and recommend the charter amendment as
being in the best interests of the corporation do so wrongly, in spite of their
fiduciary duties. In Section III.D, I speculate about how this could come to
pass. However, such an argument would also mean that the large majority
of shareholders that vote for the charter amendment as being in their own
best interests are also mistaken, which seems implausible.
C. The Contractarian Perspective
Another way to evaluate the broker voting change is from the
perspective of the contractarian view of corporate law. Economists and
corporate law scholars have long understood the corporation as a “nexus of
contracts” among different parties in the corporation.145 To the extent this
analogy holds, the corporate charter is the central part of that contract. The
charter defines the key terms of the contract among the corporation and its
shareholders (which I will refer to as the “corporate contract”)—either by
incorporating those terms explicitly, or by remaining silent and therefore
adopting the default terms set out in state law. One of the crucial terms in
the contract is the process for its amendment. The corporate law of most
states provides certain mandatory requirements for charter amendments,
although all states allow these to be modified in certain ways in the charter.
Charter terms do not explicitly deal with broker voting. However, as the
discussion in Part I indicates, the treatment of broker voting is central to the
results of shareholder approval votes, because of its influence on the level of
turnout, and because brokers overwhelmingly vote in favor of management
proposals. As a result, the term of the corporate contract that deals with the

145

See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1416 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ.
305 (1976).
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requirements for shareholder approval of amendments is predicated on
certain expectations about the treatment of broker voting.
The amendment terms of the charters in almost all of the companies in
my sample were adopted prior to January 2012.146 These amendment terms
were predicated on uninstructed broker voting being permitted on charter
amendments. As discussed above, it was also generally understood that
brokers voted overwhelmingly in favor of management,147 and that broker
votes represented, on average, about 10% of shares outstanding.148 The
prohibition on broker voting on charter amendments implicitly modifies the
amendment requirements of corporate charters from how they were
understood by directors and shareholders. To the extent this resulted in
frozen charters, the expectation of directors and shareholders that the
charter could be amended given a certain level of shareholder support has
been thwarted.149 Thwarting the intention of the corporate contract is valuereducing because it results in a move away from contractual terms agreed to
by all of the parties to the contractual nexus of the corporation.150 As a result,
it is likely that changing the terms of the contract from those that were
understood by the parties results in a less efficient corporate contract. 151
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147

148
149

150
151

Ten companies in my sample successfully amended their charters to reduce or
eliminate supermajority requirements for charter amendments at their 2012
annual meetings.
See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 14; Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1347, 1360 (2011)
(“[T]he broker can vote the uninstructed shares in its discretion—which
usually means in accordance with management recommendations.”).
Bethel & Gillan, supra note 44, at 42.
The significance of this point is diminished by many other changes to the factors
that influence the difficulty of amending corporate charters since those charters
were entered into—for instance, the rise of institutional investors. However
many such changes are endogenous to the shareholders or the corporation,
whereas the broker voting change is exogenous.
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 145.
A long-standing debate in corporate law concerns whether the initial corporate
contract is efficient. Corporate contracts are understood to be efficient because
the parties designing the corporate contract cannot benefit from introducing
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Even if the corporate contract were not completely efficient, taking away
the ability to amend the contract would make the contract more efficient
only in a very narrow and unlikely set of circumstances.152
D. Directors’ and Managers’ Perspective
Throughout this Article I have assumed that, because charter
amendments require the approval of directors, directors (and managers)
support such charter amendments. However, there may be reasons to
believe that directors and managers prefer that certain amendments fail,
notwithstanding their approval of the amendments. There are a small
number of management proposals where directors have not given a
recommendation either for or against the proposal, or have recommended
against the proposal. Table 6 below sets out the number of such
recommendations for charter and bylaw amendments from 2005 to 2013.

152

inefficient terms, because the other parties are informed of their value, and will
price the inefficient term accordingly. Therefore, the parties to the initial
charter will draft value-maximizing terms. If the corporate contract is efficient,
then any unintended change to the corporate contract—such as a change in the
effect of the amendment term—will make the contract less efficient.
Having the option to amend the contract is likely to be efficient. Evidence for
the efficiency of amendment can be found in the fact that public company
charters could effectively prevent amendments by requiring 100% unanimity;
however, only one company in my sample implemented this requirement. In
order for a charter preventing amendment to be efficient, shareholders would
have to believe that there is some benefit to preventing themselves from
amending the charter, and that that benefit would outweigh the cost of
preventing current or future amendments to the charter. Of course, despite
these beliefs, shareholders could not have already taken the efficient action to
prevent future amendments. In any other set of circumstances, changing the
amendment term to prevent amendment will reduce the value of the company.
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Table 6: Number of ‘No Recommendation’ and ‘Against’ Recommendations by
Type of Management Proposal, 2005-2013
No
Recommendation

‘Against’
Recommendation

All proposals

Charter Amendments153

7

2

1,826

Bylaw Amendments

2

4

359

Other

8

1

260

Total

17

7

2,445

Although there are very few instances where directors do not
recommend in favor of a management proposal,154 there are a large number
of situations where management proposals approved by directors were
preceded at the previous annual meeting by shareholder proposals that
directors recommended against, and put forward numerous arguments
against, casting doubt that the directors’ approvals and recommendations
of a management proposal signal their true preferences. The most explicit
example of directors bringing a proposal they do not personally support
occurred at the 2013 annual meeting of Costco Wholesale Corporation. The
board of directors approved a management proposal to declassify the
board,155 but the board made no recommendation about the proposal, and

153
154

155

These include amendments of both charter and bylaws.
One reason there may be so few instances where directors make no
recommendation or recommend against a proposal is because failing to
recommend the proposal may cast doubt on whether the directors believe the
proposal is in the best interests of the company, and therefore whether their
decision to approve the proposal was consistent with their fiduciary duties.
The management proposal followed a shareholder proposal put forward by the
Pension Reserves Investment Management Board, which was represented by
the Shareholder Rights Project. See Proposals for the 2013 Proxy Season (2013),
Shareholder Rts. Project, http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/2013declassification-proposals.shtml.
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stated that “each director has advised the Company that as a shareholder
he or she intends to vote AGAINST the proposal.”156
Why might directors approve amendments that they personally
disfavor? This may be the case if a precatory shareholder proposal
requesting the amendment has previously been approved by the
shareholders of the company. The voting guidelines of many institutional
investors indicate that, if that is the case, they will withhold votes from
directors that fail to implement the request contained in the shareholder
proposal.157 Similarly, the policies of the major proxy advisory firms are to
recommend withhold votes against directors that fail to implement the
request contained in a successful shareholder proposal.158 Directors wishing
to avoid having a significant proportion of votes withheld in their own
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Definitive Proxy Statement, Costco Wholesale Corp. 27 (Dec. 17, 2013)
(emphasis in original). Costco Wholesale Corporation is a Washington
corporation. Its actions are unlikely to be permissible in other states. For
example, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) requires that the board of
directors adopt a resolution “declaring [the] advisability” of a charter
amendment.
See, e.g., State Street Global Advisors, 3 Proxy Voting and
Engagement
Guidelines
(Mar.
2015),
http://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-socialgovernance/2015/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-Guidelines-UnitedStates.pdf [http://perma.cc/QMZ8-QZ68] (“SSGA may withhold votes from
directors based on the following: . . . Directors of companies that have ignored
a shareholder proposal which received a majority of the shares outstanding at
the last annual or special meeting, unless management submits the proposal(s)
on the ballot as a binding management proposal, recommending shareholders
vote for the particular proposal(s) . . . .”).
See, e.g., Institutional S’holders Servs. Inc., U.S. Summary
Proxy
Voting
Guidelines
15
(2016),
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2016-us-summary-votingguidelines-dec-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CVC-VHZZ] (indicating that ISS
will generally vote for board nominees, except, inter alia, that it will “[v]ote
case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board
of directors as appropriate if: . . . [t]he board failed to act on a shareholder
proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous
year.”).
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elections may therefore comply with shareholder wishes that an amendment
be put forward, even though they personally oppose the amendment.
This is most likely to be the case for potential charter amendments,
where directors’ (and managers’) preferences regarding amendments
diverge from the preferences of the substantial majority of shareholders,
such as charter amendments to remove anti-takeover measures like
classified boards. In these cases, it is possible that shareholders may prefer
to amend the charter to remove such anti-takeover defenses, based on the
belief that the threat of a takeover may encourage management to perform
more effectively, and shareholders may benefit from the potential premium
paid in the case of a takeover. Consequently, shareholder proposals put
forward in 2014 requesting that companies remove classified boards, a key
takeover defense, received average support of 81% of votes cast.159 However,
managers may prefer not to amend the charter to remove anti-takeover
provisions, for corresponding reasons – the threat of a takeover that might
lead to their replacement will reduce their job security, and put more
pressure on them to perform than they may otherwise prefer.160
V. Fixing Frozen Charters
In this Part, I consider how the problems described above may be
mitigated. I consider four kinds of solutions. Most obviously, the changes in
the broker voting change could be reversed. Alternatively, steps could be
taken to reduce the level of uninstructed broker votes. If uninstructed
broker votes cannot be eliminated, a proportional system of voting could be
implemented, or a system could be devised to permit uninstructed broker
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See Georgeson, supra note 91, at 20.
Although this might prompt the question of whether such managers, or others
acting with their interests in mind, were instrumental in bringing about the
broker voting change, interviews with NYSE and SEC staff who were in
relevant positions at the time the broker voting change was implemented
suggest that this is not the case, and that the result was an unintended
consequence, albeit one that such managers may not disfavor (interview notes
on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
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voting in particular circumstances. I conclude with some comments on the
procedure by which any reform should be undertaken.
I evaluate each of the solutions presented below against the goals
inherent in the framework developed in Section II.A above: to reduce both
distorted fail proposals and distorted pass proposals. As discussed in
Section II.C above, there were only a small number of management
proposals that received low levels of shareholder support from 2012 to 2014,
which limited the positive impact of eliminating distorted pass proposals
during that period.161 However, it is not possible to conclude that this
distribution of shareholder support is the natural state of the world. Indeed,
it is possible to conceive of circumstances where a much larger number of
proposals might receive low shareholder support.162 For the reasons set out
in Section II.C, it seems unlikely that directors of a significant number of
companies would bring proposals that had a significant chance of failing.
However, since the possibility cannot be ruled out, any solution to the
problem of distortion should minimize the risk of distorted passes as well as
reducing the incidence of distorted fails. The ideal solution would therefore
undo the effects of the broker voting change in freezing corporate charters163
(as well as other “distorted fails” for bylaw amendments, and insider
vetoes), while maintaining the potential benefits of the broker voting change
in reducing distorted passes. I also comment on the potential cost and
workability of the solutions.
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See supra Section II.C.
For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, a significant number of companies
amended their charters to put in place takeover defenses, such as staggered
boards. These types of amendments may have received significantly lower
levels of shareholders support.
There are a number of companies that have frozen charters that are not the
result of the broker voting change. Because of high supermajority requirements
and/or low shareholder turnout, these companies would have frozen charters
even if broker voting were permitted. Remedying frozen charters in these cases
would require some other kind of intervention—for instance, court intervention
to invalidate the supermajority requirement of the charter.
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Before discussing potential systemic solutions to the problem created by
the broker voting change, it is worth discussing solutions that individual
companies can implement. Most obviously, as discussed in Section III.A, a
corporation could use the services of a proxy solicitor to increase its turnout.
This option, including its limitations, is discussed in Section V.B. A
company with a frozen charter generally cannot reduce the voting
requirements for amending the charter, as such requirements themselves
are generally also subject to the same voting requirements. There are also
two theoretically possible but practically far-fetched solutions: disregarding
the charter provision164 and undertaking a merger to remove the charter

164

A company could disregard the voting requirement provision in its charter, and
seek judicial validation either in advance or after the fact. A similar process
occurred at Baxter International Inc. The corporation had tried in 2006, 2011,
2012, and 2013 to amend its charter to declassify its board of directors (two of
these proposals followed engagement with the Nathan Cummings Foundation,
which was represented by the Shareholder Rights Project). Each attempt failed
because of a provision in the corporation’s charter that required approval of “at
least two-thirds of the holders of all the securities of the Corporation then
entitled to vote on such change” to amend the declassification provision. See
Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation,
Filed as Exhibit 3.1 to Current Report (Form 8-K), at 8 (2013).
In 2014, the Delaware Court of Chancery found (and the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed) that a very similarly worded voting agreement provision was
ambiguous and should be treated as providing for a per-share scheme. Salamone
v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354 (Del. 2014). Pursuant to an agreement with an activist
investor, Third Point Advisors, Baxter brought an application in the Court of
Chancery to validate its treatment of its voting provision as a per-share scheme.
However, the Court of Chancery denied Baxter’s motion since the provision
had not been put to a vote. See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A),
Baxter International Inc. 62–63 (Mar. 24, 2016). After the charter
amendment was approved at the corporation’s 2016 annual meeting on a pershare basis, the Court of Chancery validated the treatment and the amendment.
In re Baxter Int’l Inc., C.A. No. 11609-CB (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 2016). However,
while this makes clear that judicial approval of a voting provision is possible if
the provision is ambiguous, it is not clear that a court would overrule an
unambiguous supermajority vote requirement.
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provision.165 Though they are unlikely to be plausible solutions for large
public corporations, I mention them for completeness.
A. Reversing the Broker Voting Change
The most obvious solution to the problems outlined in Parts II and III is
to reverse the broker voting change. This would have the converse
consequences to those described in Parts II and III above. The distorted pass
results caused by the broker voting change would disappear: the frozen
charters caused by the broker voting change and bylaws made amendable
only by the board would once again be amendable by shareholder vote, and
the number of insider vetoes would be reduced. However, the possibility of
distorted fail proposals would be reinstated. As discussed above, given the
current practice of corporations, whereby very few bring management
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A corporation could theoretically undertake a merger into a wholly-owned
subsidiary specially created for that purpose, and stipulate that the charter of
the other corporation become the charter of the surviving corporation. The
charter of the other corporation could be set up as identical to the charter of the
existing corporation, but with a lower voting requirement for charter
amendments. This assumes either that the voting requirement for stockholder
votes to approve mergers is lower than that to amend the charter, or that a
merger vote would have a higher shareholder turnout. This may have
unforeseen consequences for the corporation’s contractual relationships—e.g.,
triggering “change of control” provisions in contracts. In addition, it would
involve substantial transaction costs for the corporation, including the
preparation of merger documents and holding a shareholder vote. See, e.g.,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c). Although state corporations laws provide
for short-form mergers into wholly-owned subsidiaries of a constituent
corporation, such that a vote of shareholders of a constituent corporation would
not be required—for example, see id. § 251(g)—that procedure only applies if
there are no changes to the certificate of incorporation of the surviving
corporation, which would not be the case here. In 2013, a new provision, id. §
251(h), was added to the Delaware Code allowing a merger without a vote of
constituent corporation shareholders. However, that provision only operates
when a corporation has made a tender offer for all of the shares of the
constituent corporation, and as a result thereof, owns at least 50% of the shares
of the constituent corporation, which is very unlikely.
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proposals that are likely to receive less than a majority of votes cast, the
benefit from eliminating those frozen charters and other distorted fail
proposals outweigh the very few instances of distorted pass proposals that
might occur. However, there remains the possibility that the number of
distorted pass proposals could increase, especially given that the reinstated
potential for distortion from broker votes could increase the likelihood of
such proposals passing. One solution could be to continue to require the
disclosure of the number of uninstructed broker votes being voted, so that
their distortive effect could be observed, and appropriate steps taken if
distorted pass results became a significant problem.
Furthermore, reversing the broker voting change could be done
inexpensively, through the NYSE’s issuance of further guidance reinstating
charter amendments to the status of “brokers may vote,” thereby allowing
brokers the discretion to vote without authority from beneficial owners.
Given the simplicity of this solution and the ease by which it could be
implemented, the broker voting change could be reversed as an interim
measure to reduce harm to shareholders during the lengthy time period that
may be required for comprehensive reforms to be designed, debated, and
implemented.
B. Reducing Uninstructed Broker Votes
An alternative solution to the problem of distortive broker votes would
be to reduce or eliminate uninstructed broker votes. If uninstructed broker
votes could be eliminated, this would obviate the need to choose between
distorted fails and distorted passes; both would be eliminated. Even if
uninstructed broker votes could only be reduced and not eliminated
entirely, this would still reduce the intensity of both kinds of distortions, and
therefore the likelihood that either would affect voting outcomes.
The number of uninstructed broker votes could be reduced in a number
of ways, some of which could be implemented by corporations, others of
which could be implemented by brokers. As discussed in Part I, most
uninstructed shares held through brokers are beneficially owned by retail
investors. Corporations can already take steps to increase the response level
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from retail shareholders. Response rates among retail investors are higher
when corporations mail proxy materials in full paper format, rather than
electronic notification, or the “notice and access” methods permitted by
the SEC.166 In addition, corporations can hire proxy solicitors to telephone
individual retail investors to encourage them to vote.
Presumably by using such techniques, a small number of the
corporations that had charter amendments fail have since been able to
increase their turnout sufficiently for similar charter amendments to pass.
Apache Corporation put forward a management proposal to declassify its
board of directors at its 2013 annual meeting.167 Despite receiving 99% of
votes cast, the proposal received votes from only 74% of shares outstanding,
below the corporation’s 80% supermajority amendment requirement, and
failed.168 Apache Corporation put forward a second declassification
proposal in at its 2014 meeting,169 and received votes from 77% of shares
outstanding yet again failing the supermajority requirement.170 Finally, in
2015, a declassification proposal put forward by the company171 passed,
receiving votes from 83% of shares outstanding.172 Three other
corporations—Capital One Financial Corporation, Chesapeake Energy
Corporation, and NCR Corporation—have been able to pass amendments
that previously failed.
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See Broadridge & PwC ProxyPulse: How Well Do You Know
Your Shareholders? (2013), http://media.broadridge.com/documents/
Broadridge-PwC-ProxyPulse-First-Edition.pdf
[http://perma.cc/82SP9GAQ] (noting that only about 17% of retail shares receiving a notice were voted
from 2007 to 2012, compared to 36% of shares receiving a full paper package).
See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), Apache Corp. 82 (Apr. 3,
2013).
See Current Report (Form 8-K), Apache Corp. 4 (May 17, 2013).
See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), Apache Corp. 76 (Apr. 2,
2014).
See Current Report (Form 8-K), Apache Corp. 2 (May 19, 2014).
See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), Apache Corp. 55 (Apr. 2,
2015).
See Current Report (Form 8-K), Apache Corp. 3 (May 20, 2015).
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However, repeated attempts at passing amendments are not always
successful—Teradata Corporation, whose attempted amendment was
described in Part II, subsequently tried173 and failed a second time to amend
its charter.174 Proxy solicitations to significantly increase turnout are also
likely to be expensive. Most proxy solicitors charge a flat fee (e.g., $15,500
in the case of Teradata’s solicitation in 2014),175 plus out of pocket expenses.
The magnitude of these expenses is not disclosed in the proxy statement,
but these are generally several dollars per shareholder contacted, with
potential fees of several dollars more if the shareholder actually votes.176 As
a result, soliciting voting instructions from a large number of shareholders
that do not instruct their brokers on how to vote can quickly become
expensive. Even if increasing turnout were successful and cost effective for
a particular corporation, to solve the general problem caused by the broker
voting changes, it would need to be undertaken in every corporation
suffering from a frozen charter, at considerable time and expense across the
affected corporations.
A more permanent solution could be to reduce the number of retail
investors. Many corporations have buyback programs targeted at small lots
of shares. However, this requires retail investors to choose to tender into
the buyback, which is unlikely to be universal. Other transactions could
compulsorily acquire small shareholdings. In a reverse stock split, a
corporation reduces the number of its outstanding shares by combining
shares in a particular ratio. If a corporation undertook a reverse stock split
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See Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), Teradata Corp. 52 (Mar. 6,
2014).
See Current Report (Form 8-K), Teradata Corp. 3 (May 5, 2014).
See Teradata Corp., supra note 173, at 58.
See, e.g., Proxy Solicitation Agreement Between Northwest Bancorp Inc. and
Laurel Hill Group, LLC, filed as Exhibit 99.8 to Northwest Bancshares, Inc.,
Pre-Effective Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Oct. 26,
2009) (stipulating telephone rates “of $3.40 per actual contact and $1.00 for
leaving a message after three attempts. For those shareholders making use of
the Quick Vote system, there will be an additional $3.00 tabulator charge per
vote taken.”).
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with a high ratio, for example, requiring that 100 old shares be exchanged
for 1 new share (a “1-for-100” reverse split), those shareholders with lots
smaller than the ratio would receive cash for their shares. However, this is
likely to be a drastic and expensive undertaking for a corporation, and since
it will affect the number of shares outstanding, may have undesired effects
on the liquidity of the company. Its costs are therefore likely to outweigh the
benefits in reducing the number of small shareholders.
An alternative solution from those implemented by corporations with
respect to their shareholders is for brokers to implement a solution with
respect to their clients. The most promising solution is client-directed
voting.177 Brokers could require their clients to direct how their shares
should be voted if they fail to give instructions for a particular meeting. For
example, clients could instruct that their shares be voted as management
recommends or against management’s recommendation. Alternatively,
clients could request that their shares be voted proportionally (as further
discussed below). To the extent that this could be implemented when
clients establish a relationship with a broker, it could significantly reduce the
number of uninstructed broker shares. However, there would inevitably be
some brokers that do not choose to participate. In addition, it may be
difficult for brokers to require existing clients to decide on a voting option,
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Client directed voting was discussed in the August 27, 2007 Addendum to the
Report and Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New York
Stock Exchange 4 (June 5, 2006) [hereinafter Proxy Working Group
Addendum]. For further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
client directed voting, see Frank G. Zarb & John Endean, Restoring Balance in
Proxy Voting: The Case for “Client Directed Voting, Harv. L. Sch. F. on
Corp.
Governance
&
Fin.
Reg.
(Feb. 14,
2010)
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/02/14/restoring-balance-in-proxyvoting-the-case-for-client-directed-voting/
[http://perma.cc/4Q86-5LT7];
John Wilcox, Fixing the Problems with Client Directed Voting, Harv. L. Sch.
F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Mar. 5, 2010)
[http://perma.cc/XY9H-LS6H]; and James McRitchie, An Open Proposal for
Client Directed Voting Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance &
Fin. Reg. (July 14, 2010), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/14/anopen-proposal-for-client-directed-voting/ [http://perma.cc/W5B6-MBDQ].
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or to force a default election upon existing clients. It is also likely that one of
the options for clients under a client-directed voting system would be to
choose that their shares not be voted if uninstructed; to the extent clients
choose this option, there would be no reduction in distorted fail results.
Although several of these solutions—especially client directed voting—
show promise, all could only be partially effective—none can completely
eliminate uninstructed shares, and therefore the problems of distorted pass
results and distorted fail results must be dealt with in another manner.
C. Proportional Voting
An alternative approach to broker voting considered by the Proxy
Working Group178 (and advocated by several commenters on the proposal
to limit uninstructed broker voting on director elections)179 is proportional
voting. This would replace the current structure whereby brokers can either
vote all of the shares they hold or none of the shares they hold depending on
the matter, with a system whereby brokers would be required to vote in
proportion to the votes of other shareholders. For instance, if 95% of other
shareholders voted in favor of a proposal, brokers would vote 95% of their
shares in favor of the proposal and 5% of their shares against the proposal.
Assuming that the preferences of shareholders holding their shares
through brokers are the same as other shareholders, this solution would
eliminate any distortion in shareholder voting. Consequently, it would avoid
both of the types of distorted outcomes discussed above. Assuming
continued high levels of shareholder support for management proposals,
proportional voting would undo the frozen charters caused by the broker
voting change, as well as the other kinds of distorted fail proposals, failed
bylaw amendments and insider vetoes. Since broker votes would follow the
votes of other shareholders, proportional voting would also avoid any
distorted fail outcomes. Proportional voting would also obviate the need for
an arbitrary list of matters on which brokers could or could not vote, such as
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See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 16-18.
See 2009 SEC Release, supra note 53, at 33,301.
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that contained in the supplementary materials to Rule 452—instead brokers
would vote proportionally on all matters.
However, proportional voting would be complicated to implement.180
Brokers would need to obtain a measure of the proportion in which they vote
their shares. There are two separate reference groups by which the
appropriate proportion could be measured—the other shareholders of the
corporation as a whole, or other shareholders that have instructed a
particular broker to vote.
The most obvious proportion for brokers to vote would be the
proportion of votes cast by all other (non-broker) shareholders of the
corporation. This would most accurately reflect overall shareholder
preferences. However, if the preferences of shareholders as a whole were
different from those shareholders who do not vote, this could result in
distortions of its own. Logistically, basing proportional voting on the
aggregate proportion of votes cast would require a tabulation of the shares
of all of the other shareholders prior to the broker submitting their
proxies.181 Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. handles the overwhelming
majority of proxy statement distribution and vote handling for most
corporations. Broadridge could provide preliminary vote counts to the
corporation for distribution to brokers, or to brokers directly. In order for
proxies to be voted by brokers, this information would need to be received
several days before votes were due. This problem has been overcome with
respect to broker-by-broker proportional voting (described below), and
although coordinating vote tallies from multiple sources would be more
difficult, this is likely to be surmountable.
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While the Proxy Working Group noted that it was “somewhat attractive, it
ultimately concluded that “in many ways proportional voting creates its own
set of problems” and that “it was not the optimum result.” See Proxy Working
Group Report, supra note 44, at 17-18.
It may also be possible for brokers to submit a blank proxy to the tabulating
organization or to directors, allowing them to vote the uninstructed shares in
the proportion that is later established.
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An alternative would be for brokers to give proxies to the proxy holders
to vote their shares in a proportion to be determined. Most proxy cards in
uncontested elections appoint selected officers or directors of the
corporation as the proxy holder, and direct the proxy holder to vote in the
manner specified on the proxy card. To implement proportional voting, the
proxy card could include an option of having the proxy holder split the
shares in the proportion voted by other shareholders.182 Such a system could
be most easily implemented by SEC regulation. While it could also
conceivably be implemented by private ordering, on a company-bycompany basis, such a solution would have significant limitations. Each
company would have to act individually, thereby duplicating significant
effort, and requiring a very long lead time for the change to be adopted by a
substantial number of companies, if at all; it is also likely that many
companies would not implement the system.183 If such a system were to be
feasibly implemented in an efficient manner, SEC regulation would
therefore be required.
The alternative to voting on an aggregate basis would be for brokers to
vote uninstructed shares according to voting proportions obtained on a
broker-by-broker basis, from the instructions each broker receives from
beneficial owners that do submit such voting instructions. A broker-bybroker system would be straightforward to implement. The brokers, or
Broadridge acting on their behalf, could tally the instructions they received
from their other beneficial owners, and then split the proxies of the
uninstructed shares in the same proportions. As above, the tabulation would
need to be done several days prior to the votes being cast. However, as
discussed in Part I above, beneficial owners holding their shares through
brokers are already required to notify the broker of their votes at least ten
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Most proxy cards already indicate that the proxy will be voted in a particular
way if no direction is made on a proxy card with respect to a particular vote,
usually following directors’ recommendations.
For a broader discussion of the relative merits of regulatory and private ordering
solutions, see Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 91.
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days before the meeting.184 As a result, the timing issue is unlikely to be a
problem. Indeed, the Proxy Working Group noted that one broker, Charles
Schwab, had implemented proportional voting as early as 2005.185 Following
the release of the Proxy Working Group’s report, the Securities and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) issued a “best practices”
memorandum recommending that their member brokers implement
proportional voting of uninstructed shares in proportion to the votes cast by
the retail clients of the broker.186 According to news reports, four large
brokers—Charles Schwab, Ameritrade, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch,
and Goldman Sachs—adopted broker-by-broker proportional voting.187 In a
presentation to SIFMA in 2007, Richard Daly, chief executive officer of
Broadridge, outlined how they provided proportional voting services to
“four large broker clients” in 2007.188 The proportion was established based
on shares voted by retail customers of the broker. The proportion was
calculated as of two days prior to the meeting, and then recalculated the day
before the meeting and the day of the meeting, in order to account for newly
voted shares.
Although a broker-by-broker system could be easily implemented, it
might result in other distortions where only a small number of street-name
holders submit instructions to a particular broker and those holders have
different preferences from other shareholders. The votes of the
shareholders that do vote would be “overweighted” to the extent of the
uninstructed shares. The larger the ratio of uninstructed shares to the shares
being used to determine the proportion, the stronger this effect. The Proxy
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See N.Y. Stock. Exch. Inc., supra note 3, at R. 451(b)(1).
See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 43, at 17.
See Proxy Working Group Addendum, supra note 177, at 4.
See Cyrus Sanati, A Surprise at the Ballot This Proxy Season?, N.Y. Times
DealBook
Blog
(Feb.
25,
2009,
1:48
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/a-surprise-at-the-ballot-thisproxy-season/ [http://perma.cc/85YY-7XWY].
See Slides from presentation by Richard J. Daly, Chief Exec. Officer, Broadridge
Financial Solutions, Inc., to SIFMA Operations Conference (Apr. 29-May 2,
2007).
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Working Group considered there to be a possibility of manipulation where
a broker has a disproportionately large number of uninstructed shares.189
However, the concerns expressed by the Proxy Working Group seem to
have been assuaged where the pool of votes used to set the proportion
included only retail investors.190 Henry Hu and Bernard Black also consider
this approach, and conclude that there is no reason to believe that the
distortion would be problematic.191
A potential argument against a proportional voting solution is that the
preferences of shareholders that do not vote may not match the preferences
of those that do vote, whether that proportion is taken on an aggregate basis
or on a broker-by-broker basis. Most clearly, shareholders holding through
brokers that do not vote (which are assumed to be retail investors) will differ
from the majority of holders of outstanding shares (which are large
institutions). To a lesser extent, shareholders holding through a certain
broker that do vote may differ from those that hold through that same broker
that do not. However, it is not clear that these differences will be substantial.
Based on a rational actor model of voting, the main difference between
shareholders that vote and shareholders that do not vote is that shareholders
that vote have informed themselves about the proposal and the outcome
that is likely to maximize value for them. The underlying interest of
shareholders that do not vote is the same—to maximize the value of their
shares. Aside from random variation, there is no reason to believe that if
non-voting shareholders informed themselves about the proposal, their
preferences would differ from that of shareholders that do vote. It is
especially unlikely that shareholders would come to differing conclusions
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See Proxy Working Group Report, supra note 44, at 17.
See Proxy Working Group Addendum, supra note 177, at 4 (“By limiting the
vote to be considered in making proportional voting decisions to the retail vote,
the Proxy Working Group thought that the potential for manipulation could be
significantly reduced.”).
See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty
Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. Penn. L. Rev. 625, 705-06 (2008)
(“This would somewhat overweight the instructions that shareholders convey,
but creates no obvious incentive problems. At the margin, the prospect of
overweighted voting might induce more economic owners to vote.”).
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where significant majorities of shareholders are in favor of a proposal—as is
the case with frozen charters by definition—and where directors and
shareholders agree on the value of the proposal.
It is clear that the logistical issues involved in a proportional voting
system are surmountable, whether through regulatory action, or through
private ordering by corporations or brokers. This would speak in favor of reallowing uninstructed broker voting, though encouraging a move towards
proportional voting.
D. Broker Voting on Certain Charter Amendments
A fourth set of alternatives would be to replace the broker voting change
with a rule that permits broker voting on a circumscribed set of corporate
governance proposals. Although this would not eliminate distortions from
broker voting in the same way as proportional voting, it would minimize the
harm from such distortions.
Allowing broker voting in any form will open up potential “empty
voting” counterarguments of the kind discussed in Section IV.A, that
brokers do not have an economic interest in the shares they are voting.
However, for the reasons outlined in that Section, this is unlikely to be a
significant problem in practice. Similarly, to the extent that the preferences
of the shareholders who do not vote differ from those that do, broker voting
that is guided by past shareholder votes (including that described in Section
V.D.2 below), will be a distortion of shareholders’ aggregate preferences,
similar to that discussed in Section V.C above with respect to proportional
voting. However, as discussed, there are reasons to believe that this may not
be a significant problem in practice.
The set of corporate governance proposals where broker voting would
be allowed would be those with the greatest likelihood of distorted fail
outcomes and the least likelihood of distorted pass outcomes. Such a rule
could be implemented by an addition to the supplementary materials to Rule
452, indicating that a broker could not vote an uninstructed proxy on a
corporate governance matter such as the kinds listed in the broker voting
change, unless the proposal met certain conditions. One version of this
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approach, described in Section V.D.2 below, was considered by NYSE and
SEC officials as an alternative to the broker voting change.192 I consider
three possible alternatives for what kind of proposals would be permitted.
1. Broker Voting for Removing Supermajorities
One set of corporate governance proposals where broker voting could
be permitted is charter or bylaw amendments to remove supermajority
provisions. Most frozen charters occur in companies with high
supermajority requirements.193 However, most supermajority requirements
cannot be removed, because they are themselves subject to supermajority
requirements for amendment. Therefore, charter amendments to remove
them are also likely to suffer distorted fails if broker voting is not permitted.
Allowing broker votes on amendments removing supermajorities would
allow the circularity problem to be broken. There are currently high levels
of shareholder support for removing supermajority provisions,194 so it is
unlikely that such a proposal would have the possibility of a distorted pass
result.
Allowing broker voting on amendments to remove supermajority
provisions envisages a two-step process for amendment of other charter
provisions: the charter would be amended to remove the supermajority
provision, then the substantive provision could be amended at a subsequent
meeting. Not only would this take several years, but also such a private
ordering solution would require each affected company to go through this
process and would therefore be more duplicative than a regulatory solution.

192

193

194

Interview with NYSE and SEC officials (on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation).
This is unsurprising. In companies without supermajorities, if a proposal is
overwhelmingly supported, then the possibility of 10-15% of shares being
uninstructed broker shares and not vote is unlikely to reduce the overall vote
below 50%.
Charter amendments to remove supermajority provisions received average of
65% of votes cast in 2014. See Georgeson, supra note 91, at 20.
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2. Broker Voting for Proposals that Shareholders Generally Support
Permitting brokers to vote only on matters that generally receive
substantial shareholder support target the kinds of proposals where frozen
charters and other distorted fail outcomes are most likely to be an issue,
while minimizing the risk of potential distortion. The possibility of a
distorted fail outcome would be eliminated, and since the proposal receives
majority support, a distorted pass outcome is also not possible.
One difficulty with this solution would lie in choosing a bright line rule
for those corporate governance proposals on which broker voting would be
permitted. One alternative would be to set out a list of topics that generally
receive strong shareholder support in the supplementary materials to Rule
452, and allow broker discretionary voting on those proposals. This
approach was considered by NYSE and SEC officials as an alternative to the
broker voting change.195 However, this approach would not reflect variances
in voting outcomes across firms and across time, and would likely need to
be updated on a regular basis through the lengthy SEC rulemaking
procedure.
A better alternative would be to permit broker voting on a proposal that
previously received a strong majority (e.g., greater than 80% of votes cast)
at a previous annual meeting of the company. Similar to the approach in
Section V.D.1 above, this would require a two-step process to amend the
charter.196 This approach would also reflect the general practice of many
corporations, which may wait for a successful shareholder proposal to

195

196

Interviews with NYSE and SEC officials (on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation).
The two steps consist of: a vote to demonstrate sufficient support at the first
meeting, and then an actual amendment vote at the second meeting, which
would likely take place the following year. In contrast to the approach in Section
V.D.1 above, the first proposal could be submitted by a shareholder, whereas a
supermajority amendment proposal would have to be put forward by the board
of directors.
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demonstrate the preferences of the company’s shareholders before putting
forward a management charter amendment proposal on a particular topic.197
3. Broker Voting Where a Supermajority is Required
A third set of corporate governance resolutions on which broker voting
could be allowed are those amendments for which a supermajority vote is
required. This would be a broader set of amendments than that described in
Section V.D.1 above.198 As discussed in Section V.D.1 above, proposals
that require a supermajority for amendment are the very proposals that are
likely to result in frozen charters and other distorted fail proposals. They are
also proposals where there is almost no likelihood of a distorted pass
outcome, since significant support for the proposal would be required for it
to pass. Permitting brokers to vote only where a supermajority of
outstanding shares is required would therefore reduce frozen charters and
other distorted fail outcomes, while minimizing potential distorted pass
outcomes. An addition to the supplementary materials permitting broker
voting on such proposals could also be drafted in a straightforward manner,
without ambiguity.
D. Procedure of Reform
As discussed in Section IV.E above, because the broker voting change
was not a formal amendment to Rule 452, it avoided the considered process
required for reviewing and approving such rule changes. Similarly, it could
easily be undone by a similar information memorandum amending the
NYSE policy on the matter.199 However, there may be reasons to believe

197

198

199

See, e.g., Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 Del.
J. Corp. L. 149 (2008).
This would also encompass all amendments with supermajority provisions that
were themselves subject to supermajority approval requirements, thereby
encapsulating the set of proposals discussed in Section V.D.1, above.
It is possible that the NYSE may face pressure from directors or managers of
some of the issuers listed on the exchange not to alter the broker voting change.
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that the NYSE will not wish to take action on the matter without going
through the SEC rulemaking procedure.200 The most practical approach
would therefore be for the NYSE to work with the SEC on developing a new
policy for the treatment of broker votes on corporate governance proposals,
and to submit that policy to the SEC for approval through the rule-making
process described in Section IV.E above.201

As discussed in Section IV.D, it is possible that some directors and managers
may prefer that certain charter amendments they have approved for submission
to a vote of shareholders do not actually pass. If this is the case, these directors
and managers may be less concerned about the shortcomings of the broker
voting change, and may wish for it to remain in effect. Since the NYSE is funded
by fees from corporations and members, rather than from investors, it may have
an incentive to take actions preferred by those responsible for the corporation—
directors and managers. If this were the case, it might be unrealistic to expect
the NYSE to act on its own initiative to solve the problems created by the broker
voting change. However, interviews with NYSE and SEC officials suggest that
this is not a realistic concern (notes of interviews with SEC and NYSE officials,
on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
200
According to interviews with NYSE and SEC officials in relevant positions at
the time the broker voting change was implemented, the SEC requested that
the NYSE issue the broker voting change to amend its current practice rather
than go through the rule-making procedure. The SEC suggested that the prior
treatment of broker votes on corporate governance proposals had not been
correct (notes of interviews with SEC and NYSE officials, on file with the Yale
Journal on Regulation). Both organizations may have a preference for a definitive
answer in the form of rulemaking, rather than a further reversal of the practice,
which may be likely to create confusion regarding the appropriate practice and
its regulatory basis.
201
If the NYSE was not willing to submit a request for a change to its rules, it is
possible for the SEC to take action of its own volition. The SEC may be able to
take action to strike down the broker voting change, on the basis that it was a
rule making, and not merely a policy change, and therefore should have been
undertaken through the rule making process. Alternatively, the SEC has the
power to unilaterally amend the rules of the NYSE. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2012). A rule-making process under the aegis
of the SEC would also be preferable to a policy change through the broker voting
change, as it would follow the same well-developed process discussed in Section
IV.E.
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Another alternative, discussed in a number of the solutions above,
would be private ordering, taken either by corporations, or by brokers.
However, given the perspective of directors and managers on the broker
voting change described in Section IV.D above, there are reasons to doubt
that directors or managers would undertake action to reverse its investorharming effect of their own volition. Instead, investors may need to engage
with directors and managers to encourage them to take such action. Given
the number of companies that would have to undertake individual action,
this process is likely to be considerably slower than a regulatory solution.
Since there are a smaller number of brokers, a broker-based private ordering
solution may be more efficient.
Given the time that an SEC or private ordering process is likely to take,
it would be optimal for the NYSE—if necessary, at the request of the SEC—
to first take action to reverse the broker voting change, so as to avoid the
investor-harming effects of the broker voting change on companies bringing
charter amendments in the interim.

Conclusion
Broker voting rules create the possibility of two kinds of distortion. If
brokers are permitted to vote and follow management recommendations,
then broker voting will positively distort vote tallies, and may result in a
distorted pass result for a proposal. The NYSE implemented the broker
voting change to prevent such distortions. However, the broker voting
change’s elimination of broker voting has another distorting effect: reducing
vote tallies from the value they would have had if the preferences of all
shareholders were considered. When disqualifying brokers from voting
results in a proposal failing where shareholders would have preferred that it
passed, there will be a “distorted fail.” Distorted fails have been the
unintended consequence of the broker voting change. As a result, parts of
the charters of a substantial number of corporations are frozen. The
shareholders of a number of corporations are unable to amend their bylaws,
and certain corporations now permit insiders a de facto veto over charter
amendments. Given current levels of support for management proposals,
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these effects significantly outweigh the possibility of distorted pass
outcomes that the broker voting change was designed to address. As a result,
although the broker voting change has an implicit investor protection
rationale, its effect has been the opposite: many charter amendments that
investors favor as being in their interests and value-enhancing can no longer
be implemented. The implicit change in the amendment term of the charter
also undermines the corporate contract. I propose a number of potential
solutions to these problems. At the very least, and as an interim measure,
the broker voting change should be reversed. The NYSE and SEC should
then work together to develop a policy for the treatment of broker votes on
corporate governance proposals that reduces both kinds of potential
distortion. The most promising potential solutions appear to be either
proportional voting or defining a set of corporate governance matters on
which brokers could and could not vote. In this way, the investor protection
rationale of broker voting reform could be upheld.
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Appendix A: Distorted Fail and Distorted Pass
Outcomes, 2012-2014
Table A.1: Failed Charter Amendments Receiving >90% of Votes Cast
Broker
Votes
(αbv)

% Req’d
(αreq)

% For +
Broker
Votes
(αfor + αbv)

Result if
BVs
permitted

Company

Year

% For
(αfor)

Alcoa Inc.

2012

47.3%

25.6%

80.0%

72.8%

Fail

Avista Corporation

2012

74.6%

11.8%

80.0%

86.4%

Pass

Duke Energy Corporation

2012

52.7%

28.8%

80.0%

81.6%

Pass

Franklin Street Properties
Corp.

2012

70.6%

16.6%

80.0%

87.1%

Pass

Hercules Offshore, Inc.

2012

67.5%

21.9%

75.0%

89.4%

Pass

PPG Industries, Inc.

2012

67.1%

12.6%

80.0%

79.8%

Fail

Piedmont Natural Gas
Company, Inc.

2012

54.5%

28.5%

80.0%

83.1%

Pass

Principal Financial Group, Inc.

2012

58.1%

05.9%

75.0%

64.0%

Fail

SUPERVALU INC.

2012

50.5%

24.1%

75.0%

74.6%

Fail

Solta Medical, Inc.

2012

61.1%

22.9%

66.7%

84.0%

Pass

St. Jude Medical, Inc.

2012

77.8%

09.1%

80.0%

87.0%

Pass

Teradata Corporation

2012

75.9%

07.9%

80.0%

83.8%

Pass

Akamai Technologies, Inc.

2013

73.2%

10.9%

75.0%

84.1%

Pass

Apache Corporation

2013

73.9%

9.5%

80.0%

83.4%

Pass

Avista Corporation

2013

73.8%

12.9%

80.0%

86.7%

Pass

2013

80.0%

05.5%

80.0%

85.4%

Pass

2013

60.1%

22.4%

66.7%

82.6%

Pass

Cliffs Natural Resources Inc.

2013

46.7%

17.4%

50.0%

64.1%

Pass

Connecticut Water Service,
Inc.

2013

57.9%

25.3%

80.0%

83.2%

Pass

Capital One Financial
Corporation
Chesapeake Energy
Corporation
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Broker
Votes
(αbv)

% Req’d
(αreq)

% For +
Broker
Votes
(αfor + αbv)

Result if
BVs
permitted

Company

Year

% For
(αfor)

Emerson Electric Co.

2013

71.2%

14.3%

85.0%

85.4%

Pass

Energen Corporation

2013

78.3%

08.9%

80.0%

87.3%

Pass

FirstEnergy Corp.

2013

73.3%

11.7%

80.0%

85.1%

Pass

2013

79.3%

08.8%

n/a

88.1%

Fail

2013

74.2%

09.2%

80.0%

83.4%

Pass

Masco Corporation

2013

76.5%

05.0%

80.0%

81.5%

Pass

Mattersight Corporation

2013

69.2%

19.7%

80.0%

88.9%

Pass

ModusLink Global Solutions,
Inc.

2013

60.9%

00.0%

75.0%

60.9%

Fail

NYSE Euronext

2013

63.3%

16.5%

80.0%

80.2%

Pass

OGE Energy Corp.

2013

65.3%

16.4%

80.0%

81.7%

Pass

PPG Industries, Inc.

2013

68.4%

12.3%

80.0%

80.7%

Pass

Principal Financial Group, Inc.

2013

61.4%

04.0%

75.0%

65.4%

Fail

QEP Resources, Inc.

2013

77.5%

09.1%

80.0%

86.7%

Pass

Reinsurance Group of
America, Incorporated

2013

81.5%

04.4%

85.0%

85.9%

Pass

SPX Corporation

2013

78.0%

06.1%

80.0%

84.1%

Pass

Southside Bancshares, Inc.

2013

56.2%

26.2%

66.7%

82.4%

Pass

St. Jude Medical, Inc.

2013

77.2%

08.9%

80.0%

86.1%

Pass

2013

70.2%

14.8%

66.7%

85.0%

Pass

2014

72.8%

08.8%

75.0%

81.6%

Pass

Apache Corporation

2014

77.4%

07.9%

80.0%

85.3%

Pass

Avista Corporation

2014

70.8%

16.0%

80.0%

86.8%

Pass

CME Group Inc.

2014

75.1%

00.0%

50.0%

75.1%

Pass

L-3 Communications
Holdings, Inc.
Marathon Petroleum
Corporation

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company
Allegheny Technologies
Incorporated
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Broker
Votes
(αbv)

% Req’d
(αreq)

% For +
Broker
Votes
(αfor + αbv)

Result if
BVs
permitted

Company

Year

% For
(αfor)

Capital One Financial
Corporation

2014

80.9%

04.8%

80.0%

85.8%

Pass

Casella Waste Systems, Inc.

2014

65.9%

11.5%

75.0%

77.4%

Pass

Dover Corporation

2014

76.6%

08.2%

80.0%

84.8%

Pass

Government Properties
Income Trust

2014

59.3%

30.6%

66.7%

89.9%

Pass

Hecla Mining Company

2014

41.1%

32.3%

80.0%

73.4%

Fail

Hess Corporation

2014

79.6%

08.2%

80.0%

87.8%

Pass

Higher One Holdings, Inc.

2014

77.8%

14.0%

80.0%

91.8%

Pass

MFA Financial, Inc.

2014

68.5%

19.1%

80.0%

87.6%

Pass

ModusLink Global Solutions,
Inc.

2014

58.0%

21.9%

75.0%

79.9%

Pass

Molycorp, Inc.

2014

49.5%

26.8%

66.7%

76.3%

Pass

NCR Corporation

2014

78.4%

09.6%

80.0%

88.0%

Pass

PPG Industries, Inc.

2014

67.1%

13.0%

80.0%

80.1%

Pass

2014

59.0%

25.7%

80.0%

84.7%

Pass

2014

72.5%

14.5%

80.0%

87.0%

Pass

Rentech, Inc.

2014

64.8%

19.8%

66.7%

84.6%

Pass

Rockwell Collins, Inc.

2014

73.1%

11.4%

80.0%

84.5%

Pass

SCANA Corporation

2014

62.4%

19.6%

80.0%

82.0%

Pass

SPX Corporation

2014

76.7%

05.5%

80.0%

82.2%

Pass

Select Income REIT

2014

37.7%

07.8%

66.7%

45.5%

Fail

St. Jude Medical, Inc.

2014

75.1%

08.8%

80.0%

83.9%

Pass

Teradata Corporation

2014

73.8%

09.3%

80.0%

83.2%

Pass

Windstream Holdings, Inc.

2014

48.0%

36.8%

66.7%

84.8%

Pass

Piedmont Natural Gas
Company, Inc.
Public Service Enterprise
Group Incorporated
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Table A.2: Failed Bylaw Amendments Receiving >90% of Votes Cast,
2012-2014
Broker
Votes
(αbv)

%
Req’d
(αreq)202

% For +
Broker
Votes
(αfor + αbv)

Result if
BVs
permitted

Company

Year

% For
(αfor)

Boston Scientific Corporation

2012

78.9%

06.6%

80.0%

85.5%

Pass

Chesapeake Energy
Corporation

2012

62.0%

19.0%

66.7%

81.0%

Pass

Cigna Corporation

2012

72.0%

09.3%

80.0%

81.3%

Pass

Piedmont Natural Gas
Company, Inc.

2012

54.5%

28.5%

80.0%

83.0%

Pass

SUPERVALU INC.

2012

50.5%

24.1%

75.0%

74.6%

Fail

Cleco Corporation

2013

76.3%

09.2%

80.0%

85.6%

Pass

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company

2013

70.4%

14.8%

66.7%

85.2%

Pass

NxStage Medical, Inc.

2014

72.1%

15.2%

75.0%

87.3%

Pass

Piedmont Natural Gas
Company, Inc.

2014

59.2%

25.7%

80.0%

84.9%

Pass

Rentech, Inc.

2014

66.5%

19.8%

66.7%

86.3%

Pass

202

Note that all of the bylaw amendments had “shares outstanding” supermajority
requirements. This is unsurprising: votes cast requirement are normally a
supermajority and would not have resulted in failures if supported by greater
than 90% of the votes cast.
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Table A.3: Management Proposals Receiving <50% Shareholder Support,
2012-2014 (Majority of Votes Cast Standard)
Broker
Votes
(αf)

Votes For
and Broker
Votes as %
of Votes
Cast
(βfor+bv)

Result if
BVs voted
in favor

Company

Year

Type of
Proposal

% Votes
Cast
For
(βfor)

FRED'S, Inc.

2012

Other

14.3%

06.3%

19.9%

Fail

Green Plains Inc.

2012

Amend
Charter

40.4%

00.0%

40.4%

Fail

2012

Other

36.6%

04.8%

39.9%

Fail

2012

Other

48.4%

11.9%

55.0%

Pass

Viad Corp

2012

Other

43.4%

04.2%

46.0%

Fail

Benchmark Electronics,
Inc.

2013

Other

46.8%

04.2%

49.2%

Fail

Wynn Resorts, Limited

2014

Amend
Bylaws

39.9%

06.3%

44.1%

Fail

Obagi Medical Products,
Inc.
Pacific Sunwear of
California, Inc.

Table A.4: Management Proposals Receiving <50% Shareholder Support,
2012-2014 (Majority of Votes Outstanding Standard)

Company
Cameron International
Corporation
Healthcare Trust of
America, Inc.

Year

2012
2014

Type of
Proposal
Amend
Charter
Amend
Charter
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%
Outst.
Cast
For
(αfor)

Broker
Votes
(αbv)

For and
Broker
Votes
(αfor+αbv)

Result if
BVs voted
in favor

40.1%

02.9%

43.0%

Fail

22.6%

00.0%

22.6%

Fail
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Appendix B: The Broker Voting Change and the
Likelihood of Charter Amendment Failure
To test empirically whether the broker voting change had a signficant
effect on the likelihood of failure of a particular proposal, I use a logistic
regression model. I use a binary variable for whether the vote passes or fails
(1 or 0, respectively), as the dependent variable. My key independent
variable is whether the vote took place between 2012 and 2014 (a binary
variable taking the value 1 for 2012 to 2014 and 0 for previous years). Given
the importance of supermajority voting requirements, I control for the
voting requirement necessary to approve the vote (αreq). In a second
specification, I add an interaction term between the vote requirement and
the time. The two specifications can be written as follows:
f(Fail) = a + b1.Time + b2. αreq + e

(1)

f(Fail) = a + b1.Time + b2. αreq + b3.Time. αreq + e

(2)

Given the low likelihood of failure with a votes cast standard, I exclude
votes that did not have a votes outstanding requirement. I cluster standard
errors by company. My results are set out in Table B.1 below.
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Table B.1: Effect of the broker voting change on Likelihood of Proposal Failing
(1)
Fail
1.041***
(0.180)000
7.028***
(0.867) 00

-6.968***
(0.598) 00

(2)
Fail
-3.491 ***
(1.303) 00
4.441***
(1.050) 00
6.570***
(1.873) 00
-5.2040***
(0.664) 00

Observations

2,051

2,051

Chi2

90.72

125.01

Difference in Odds Ratios for Time
(Time = 1 – Time = 0)

0.1006

0.0489

Variables
Time (2012-2014)
Vote Required
Time × Vote Required
Constant

As Table B.1 shows, whether or not the vote took place after the broker
voting change is significant at the 1% level in determining the probability of
the vote failing. In the second model, which shows a better degree of fit, the
likelihood of a proposal failing increases 4.9% if the proposal took place after
the broker voting change.
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Appendix C: Charter Amendments and Director
Election Turnout
In Part III, I used director election turnout to predict the companies that
are likely to have frozen charters. This approach is predicated on a number
of key assumptions. First, it assumes that turnout for director election
proposals at a particular meeting is correlated with turnout for corporate
governance proposals. Second, it assumes that turnout for director election
proposals is unaffected by whether there is a corporate governance proposal
being voted on at the election or is affected in a consistent way. In this
Appendix C, I examine the validity of each of these assumptions.
A. Correlation with Director Election Turnout
In order to test the assumption that turnout for corporate governance
proposals is correlated with the turnout for director election proposals at a
particular meeting, I use data for meetings taking place after the broker
voting change took effect. After that time broker votes are excluded from
vote tallies for both director election proposals and corporate governance
proposals, permitting a simple calculation of the correlation between the
two.
Figure C.1 below shows turnout for director election proposals and
corporate governance proposals.
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Figure C.1: Correlation between Turnout for Corporate Governance Proposals
and Director Elections
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As Figure C.1 illustrates, director election proposal turnout and
corporate governance proposal turnout are almost perfectly correlated, with
a correlation coefficient of 99.9%. Figure C.1 makes clear that there are a
small number of meetings—seven out of 379 meetings, or 1.8%—where
corporate governance turnout varies from director voting turnout by more
than 1%; these are likely to be instances of irregularities in the treatment or
disclosure of broker non-votes.203

203

The meetings where there was such a variance were the 2012 meeting of Cigna
Corporation, the 2012 meeting of Redwood Trust, Inc., the 2013 meeting of
Tredegar Corporation, the 2013 meeting of Walter Investment Management
Corp., the 2013 meeting of Joy Global Inc., the 2014 meeting of The NASDAQ
OMX Group, Inc., and the 2013 meeting of Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.
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This has intuitive support—director election proposals and corporate
governance proposals appear on the same proxy card. There seems to be
little reason to believe that a shareholder would vote on one proposal and
not the other. The largest shareholders of most corporations are mutual
funds and pension funds, which have fiduciary duties to vote their shares.204
This gives confidence that director election proposal turnout can be used as
a proxy for corporate governance proposal turnout.
B. Turnout in Director Elections When a Corporate Governance Proposal Is
Also Being Voted on
In the model described in in Part III, I use turnout in director elections
as a proxy for the expected turnout if there were a corporate governance
proposal at a particular company. However, in the elections I am using to
make predictions, there are no corporate governance proposals being voted
on. Therefore my predictions depend on the assumption that turnout will
be the same where there is not a corporate governance proposal on the ballot
(the data I am using) and when there is a corporate governance proposal on
the ballot (the situations I am trying to predict). There are reasons to suggest
that this may not be the case. Shareholders may be aware of the possibility
of a frozen charter, and therefore the importance of voting, and may be more
likely to vote at such meetings. Alternatively, if managers of corporations
putting forward a corporate governance proposal wish the proposal to
succeed, they may hire a proxy solicitor, who will take active steps to
increase shareholder turnout, either by sending additional correspondence
to shareholders encouraging them to vote, or by telephoning shareholders
to encourage them to vote.
To examine this assumption, I look at that set of companies that had a
corporate governance proposal in a particular year, t, and that did not have
a corporate governance proposal in the previous year, t-1. I look at years
from 2010 onwards, when broker votes were excluded on director election
proposals. I compare director election turnout in the year with the corporate
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governance proposal on the ballot (αto,t), and turnout in the previous year
(αto,t-1). Figure C.2, below, plots αto,t against αto,t-1, as well as the trendline of
the data, and a line showing equality.
Figure C.2: Scatterplot of Turnout in Years with a Corporate Governance
Proposal and Lagged Turnout in Years Without a Corporate Governance
Proposal
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As Figure C.2 illustrates, there is a strong correlation between director
election turnout in years where there is a corporate governance proposal on
the ballot and years where there is not (a correlation of 76.4%), but with some
significant variation year to year. While there is some variation from a
perfect correlation (shown by divergence from the 45° line), this is likely to
be the result of random year-to-year variation in turnout. For comparison,
Figure C.3 below compares director election proposal turnout in years when
there is no corporate governance proposal on the ballot from director
election turnout in the same company in the previous years, in which there
is also no corporate governance proposal on the ballot.
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Figure C.3: Scatterplot of Turnout in Years Without a Corporate Governance
Proposal and Lagged Turnout in Years Without a Corporate Governance
Proposal
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Figure C.3 exhibits similar variation to Figure C.2, albeit with a slightly
higher correlation (82.7%). However, there are a similar number of outlying
observations with significant year-to-year variation. The trendline in both
Figure C.2 and Figure C.3 shows some mean reversion—that firms with
lower turnout in the previous year have higher turnout in the following year,
and vice versa—but not a systematic bias toward an increase in turnout
among companies that moved from not having a proposal to having a
proposal.
To test this relationship, I generate a metric, αΔto, that calculates the
increase in director election turnout, αto, from year t-1 to director election
turnout in year t, as follows:
αto,t - αto,t-1
αΔto =
αto,t-1
I split firm-years in my sample into four types: those with no corporate
governance proposal in year t-1 or year t (‘0,0’ firm-years); those with a

93

Frozen Charters
corporate governance proposal in year t-1 but not in year t (‘1,0’ firm-years);
those with no corporate governance proposal in year t-1 but a corporate
governance proposal in year t (‘0,1’ firm-years); and those with corporate
governance proposals in each year (‘1,1’ firm-years). Table C.1 below
illustrates the breakdown, and shows the number of firm-years in each
category.
Table C.1: Breakdown of Years in Sample based on Corporate Governance
Proposals in Year t-1 and Year t

Year t-1

Year t

No Corporate
Governance Proposal

Corporate Governance
Proposal

No Corporate
Governance Proposal

Corporate Governance
Proposal

(0,0) firm-years

(0,1) firm-years

812 firm-years

432 firm-years

(1,0) firm-years

(1,1) firm-years

347 firm-years

60 firm-years

Figure C.4 below shows the distribution of αΔto for (0,0) and (0,1) firmyears.
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Figure C.4: Distribution of αΔto for (0,0) and (0,1) Firm-Years
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If there were a systematic increase between years without a corporate
governance proposal and years with a corporate governance proposal, we
would expect to see the (0,1) firm-year distribution slightly to the right of
the (0,0) distribution. However, as Figure C.4 shows, there is no obvious
difference between the two distributions.
If there were no systematic increase in a year in which there is a
corporate governance proposal, then we would expect the mean of the
distribution for years in which there is a corporate governance proposal to
be the same as the mean of the distribution in years where there is no
proposal. Table C.2 below shows the means for of αΔto and for the samples
of αΔto where there is a proposal and there is no proposal, and the results of
t-tests for the differences between years where there is a proposal and where
there is no proposal.
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Table C.2: Comparison of Means of Firm-Years (0,1) and (0,0)
Firm-year

n

Mean αΔto

Std. Error

95% Conf. Interval

(0,1)

432

0.0076

0.0058

-0.0038

0.0189

(0,0)

812

0.0165

0.0038

0.0091

0.0240

(0,1) - (0,0)

-0.0090

0.0067

-0.0221

0.0041

t-test for
(0,1) - (0,0) > 0

t = -1.345

d.f. = 1242

Pr( (0,1) - (0,0) > 0)

0.0894

Contrary to expectations, the mean of the (0,1) group is lower than the
mean of the (0,0) group, by 0.00899. That is, the change in turnout from
firm-years where there was no proposal in year t-1 to a proposal in year t is
less than the increase between two years when there was no proposal in
either year, by 0.8%. However, the results of the t-test for the difference of
means is probability of that this difference is greater than zero is only
0.0894.
However, this is not the end of the matter. The lack of effect over the
entire group of corporate governance proposals may belie an effect in the
subset of companies that I am concerned with that is nonetheless washed
out by a lack of effect among other companies. Consider when a corporation
may employ a proxy solicitor to try and increase its turnout in order to
increase the likelihood that a corporate governance proposal passes. Having
a proxy solicitor increase turnout is expensive, so a rational board of
directors will not employ such measures in all instances. If the board
believes the shareholder proposal is likely to pass without any intervention,
there is no need to employ a proxy solicitor. Assuming strong shareholder
support for a proposal, this is likely to be the case if the turnout in the
previous year was above the voting requirement for the proposal. If the
proposal is likely to fail even if a proxy solicitor is employed, then the
corporation is also unlikely to expend the resources in a futile effort. This is
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likely to be the case if the firm has a supermajority requirement, and turnout
in the previous year was significantly below the vote required for the
proposal to pass. Only if the proposal is likely to fail by a small margin if a
proxy solicitor is not employed might the corporation consider employing a
proxy solicitor and increasing its turnout.205
Table C.3 below shows the corresponding means and t-test, where the
sample of firms to those where there was a supermajority requirement, and
the turnout in year t-1 was less than the vote required (αreq) but still within
0.10 of αreq, i.e.:
αreq – 0.1 < αto,t-1 < αreq
Table C.3: Comparison of Means of Firm-Years (0,1) and (0,0) Where αto,t-1 is
Within 0.10 of αreq
Firm-year

n

Mean αΔto

Std. Error

95% Conf. Interval

(0,1)

36

0.0081

0.0140

-0.0202

0.0365

(0,0)

70

0.0188

0.0091

0.0006

0.0370

(0,1) - (0,0)

-0.0107

0.0162

-0.0427

0.0214

t-test for
(0,1) - (0,0) > 0

t = -0.659

d.f. = 104

Pr( (0,1) - (0,0) > 0)

0.256

Table C.3 shows the expected sign for the mean change in turnout—i.e.,
that there was, on average, a very small (0.8%) increase in turnout in firm
years with corporate governance proposals, where the previous year’s
turnout was close to but below the vote required. However, Table C.3 again

205

For an analysis of strategic employment of proxy solicitors in the context of
shareholder proposals, see Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close
Ones, 10 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 159 (2008).
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shows a lower change between firm-years where there was no proposal and
when there was a proposal, than between two firm-years in which there was
no proposal, despite the sample being limited to situations where
management would be more likely to employ a proxy solicitor.206
I also consider this question within a multivariate model, using a panel
data set. I once again use as the dependent variable the proportionate change
in turnout from the previous year. I include dummy variables for each of the
sets of firm-years described above as (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1). The base case,
where each of these dummy variables is zero, represents the set of firmyears described above as (0,0). In a second specification of this model, I also
use dummy variables that take the value of 1 where the turnout in the
previous year is below the vote requirement by less than 0.10 (αreq - αto,t-1 <
0.10). Table C.4 below shows the results.

206

A test of firms that had turnout in year t-1 of less than αreq but still within 0.05
of αreq, i.e., αreq – 0.05 < αto,t-1 < αreq, “not reported” shows a similar result.
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Table C.4: Results of Multivariate Regression
(1)
αΔto
-0.0113*
-1.71
-0.00859
-1.16
-0.0164
-0.83

0.0182***
6.85

(2)
αΔto
-0.0096
-1.38
-0.00834
-1.12
-0.0188
-0.95
0.0448*
2.1
-0.01845
-0.94
0.0141***
3.98

R2

0.0012

0.0016

N

1,651

1,651

Yes

Yes

Variables
Firm years (0,1)
Firm year (1,0)
Firm years (1,1)
αreq – 0.1 < αto,t-1 < αreq
Firm year (0,1) x
αreq – 0.1 < αto,t-1 < αreq
Constant

Firm Fixed Effect

As before, the coefficients are not significant and are in fact negative,
and this suggests that there is no increase in the event of a shareholder
proposal being on the ballot (and there may be a very small decrease). This
is also the case for the coefficient on the interaction term for (0,1) firm years
where the turnout is within 10% of the vote requirements—even in those
cases, director election turnout decreased in the year where there was a
corporate governance proposal on the ballot.
The foregoing analysis allows the rejection of the possibility that turnout
might increase in the event that a corporate governance proposal is included
on the ballot.
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